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This master thesis studies how trade liberalization affects the firm-level productivity and industrial evolution. To do so, I built a 
dynamic model that considers firm-level productivity as endogenous to investigate the influence of trade on firm’s productivity and 
the market structure. In the framework, heterogeneous firms in the same industry operate differently in equilibrium. Specifically, 
firms are ex ante identical but heterogeneity arises as an equilibrium outcome. Under the setting of monopolistic competition, this 
type of model yields an industry that is represented not by a steady-state outcome, but by an evolution that rely on the decisions 
made by individual firms. I prove that trade liberalization has a general positive impact on technological adoption rates and  hence 
increases the firm-level productivity. Besides, this endogenous technology adoption model also captures the stylized facts: 
exporting firms are larger and more productive than their non-exporting counterparts in the same sector. I assume that the number 
of firms is endogenous, since, according to the empirical literature, the industrial evolution shows considerably different patterns 
across countries; some industries experience large scale of firms’ exit in the period of contracting market shares, while some 
industries display relative stable number of firms or gradually increase quantities. The special word “shakeout” is used to describe 
the dramatic decrease in the number of firms. In order to explain the causes of shakeout, I construct a model where forward-looking 
firms decide to enter and exit the market on the basis of their state of technology. In equilibrium, firms choose different dates to 
adopt innovation which generate a gradual diffusion process. It is exactly this gradual diffusion process that generates the rapid, 
large-scale exit phenomenon. Specifically, it demonstrates that there is a positive feedback between firm’s exit and adoption, the 
reduction in the number of firms increases the incentives for remaining firms to adopt innovation. Therefore, in the setting of 
complete information, this model not only generates a shakeout but also captures the stability of an industry. However, the s olely 
national view of industrial evolution neglects the importance of international trade in determining the shape of market structure. In 
particular, I show that the higher trade barriers lead to more fragile markets, encouraging the over-entry in the initial stage of 
industry life cycle and raising the probability of a shakeout. Therefore, more liberalized trade generates more stable market 
structure from both national and international viewpoints. The main references are Ederington and McCalman(2008,2009). 
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The assumptions of homogeneous firms, perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale in traditional trade theory are not consistent with empirical evidences on firms‘ 
heterogeneity within an industry. Firms‘ heterogeneity is observed as the differences in 
productivity, size, and capital and skill intensity, and these factors have significant 
influence on firms‘ involvement in global market, in particular, the decision of export. 
The move from the old trade theory to the ―new‖ trade theory by considering the 
assumptions of heterogeneous firm, imperfect competition and increasing returns to 
scale to investigate the connection of trade liberalization and the gains from lower trade 
barriers has been the subject of considerable debates in recent decades. There are two 
branches debate; one focuses on the macro-level analysis openness to trade and its 
relationship to economic growth (GDP growth). The second focuses on the plant-level 
behaviour to seek for the link of productivity improvement and trade liberalization. It 
asks, in response to more intense competition from foreign counterparts after exposure 
to international trade, whether domestic firms can achieve higher productivity by 
becoming exporters or by been forced to exit from the industry. In this paper, I will 
concentrate on the microeconomic level to investigate the effect of trade liberalization 
on firm‘s productivity and the market structure. Specifically, I will focus on how 
liberalized trade affects firm-level productivity and industrial evolution.  
 
Even though firms show vast distinctions in multiple dimensions, in this paper, I 
specifically point out the heterogeneity arises from the different adoption dates of new 
technology. In other words, firms are different with regard to the technology ability. 
Besides, given the existence of an innovation, it is assumed the adoption of the new 
technology is not simultaneous but sequential, which is consistent with the conventional 
wisdom and empirical evidences. The available facts have suggested the adoption of 
innovation in an industry could be modelled as a logistic function with a lengthy 
diffusion process. As stated by Karshenas and Stoneman (1995): 
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The diffusion of new technology takes time, often a considerable period of time. 
Whether it be a new consumer technology spreading across households or a new 
producer(process) technology spreading across firms it would not be unusual for  the 
time period between first use and say 90 per cent usage of that technology to take 
several decades rather than several years. 
 
It is this gradually technology diffusion process induces the productivity differences 
persistently exist across firms within the same industry. Consequently, it highlights in 
this paper, the endogenous source of plant-level heterogeneity comes from the different 
adoption dates among firms. In addition, the key issue I am concerned is: the impact of 
trade liberalization on the technology diffusion rates in an industry and its influence on 
shaping the market structure. There only exits a small literature on the effects of trade 
on adoption rate (see Rodrik, 1992; Miyagiwa and Ohno, 1995), but they all concentrate 
on the setting of a single import-competing firm. In contrast, this paper attempts to 
illuminate the link of trade liberalization on technology adoption rates and market 
structure with the condition of firm heterogeneity existing in the dynamic intra-industry 
trade environment. 
 
Two models of heterogeneous firms with international trade will be introduced in this 
paper. One is of Ederington and McCalman (2008)----Endogenous Firm Heterogeneity 
and the Dynamics of Trade Liberalization (henceforth E&M (2008)). The other is also 
from Ederington and McCalman (2009)----International Trade and Industrial Dynamics 
(henceforth E&M (2009)). In the paper, I will research on two subjects. The first subject 
concerns trade liberalization and its effects on firm-level productivity. There are plenty 
of literatures which have documented the dynamic productivity gains from free trade. 
The most distinguished theoretical papers which connect the firm‘s productivity and the 
impact of lower trade barriers are Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum 
(2003) (henceforth BEJK(2003)). In these papers, they illuminate that, the existence of 
trade costs lead to only the most productive firms who can cover the export costs 
self-select into export market. Besides, as trade barriers decline, the least productive 
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non-export firms are forced to exit and the most productive firms expand their export 
scales. This induces the reallocation of production towards more productive firms, 
which generates the growth in aggregate productivity. In other words, these models 
have proved, reallocation of production is an important way to enhance total 
industry-level productivity in response to trade liberalization. However, the empirical 
evidences (e.g., see Pavcnik, 2002; Trefler, 2004;) also reveal the second source of 
productivity improvement----firm-level productivity increases. It is the second source of 
productivity gain as my first research question.  
 
The second subject concentrates on the topic of how industry life cycle is affected by 
trade liberalization. According to the empirical literature, the patterns of industry 
evolution vary significantly across countries: some industries have relative stable 
number of firms across time while others show dramatic change in the number of firms: 
they often exit after reaching to the peak. In other words, there is sharp decrease in the 
number of firms. The special word ―shakeout‖ is used to describe the dramatic decrease 
in the number of firms. The studies by Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper and 
Grandy (1990) state, there are 22 industries experienced a shakeout out of 46, with 
average 52% of the firms exiting from the industry. Therefore, shakeout may be a 
normal phenomenon in product life cycle. In addition, a number of literature also 
emphasize that the technological change plays a key role in shaping market structure 
(e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1978; Flaherty, 1980; Metcalfe and Gibbons, 1988). 
Consequently, understanding the causes of firms exit in product life cycle may provide 
us some insights into the broader question of what determines an industry‘s market 
structure. In particular, my second research question is: how trade liberalization affects 
new technology distribution among firms and its impact on shaping the market 
structure. 
 
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. In chapter two, previous work has 
been reviewed. I find that, a vast majority of literature reveal that trade liberalization 
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increases the aggregate industry productivity through reallocation of production (e.g., 
Melitz, 2003; BEJK, 2003). However, empirical evidences also reveal the increase in 
plant-level productivity is another prominent source of productivity gains in response to 
trade liberalization. In addition, a few papers (e.g., Petrakis and Roy, 1999; Götz, 2002) 
that illuminate liberalized trade can affect the stability of an industry in a 
heterogeneous-firm model.  
 
In chapter three I present an analytical traceable of dynamic heterogeneous model with 
international trade under the setting of monopolistic competition. My analysis heavily 
relies on the model devolved by E&M (2008) which have found trade has a generally 
positive impact on the equilibrium adoption rates and boosts the plant-level productivity. 
The original model is presented by Reinganum, (1981); Fudenberg and Tirole, (1985); 
Götz, (1999). Nevertheless, E&M (2008) extend the model that incorporates 
international trade and firms endogenously choose to export or not. Besides, this type of 
model assumes, an industry is not represented by a steady-state outcome but by an 
evolution that depends on the decision of individual firms. I contribute to the original 
article by showing how liberalized trade affects equilibrium adoption rates and hence 
the influence on firm-level productivity. 
 
In chapter four, I present the model developed by E&M (2009). They have extended the 
model of E&M (2008) to explore how the market structure is affected by the liberalized 
trade. Specifically, they contribute in the original article from two ways. First, based on 
individual state of technology, forward-looking firms are self-selected when making 
decisions. Under this setting, ex ante identical firms endogenously choose to adopt the 
innovation at different dates, and this gradually dispersed technology process generates 
the phenomenon that a large number of firms exit which has been documented in the 
industry. Furthermore, this framework not only captures the exiting phenomenon but 
also generates the stable industry structure. Second, by embodying international trade, 
this framework also investigates how the industry evolution is affected by global 
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competition. In particular, they demonstrate trade barriers lead to a more fragile market 
and thus encouraging the temporary entry of firms and raising the likelihood of a 
shakeout.  
 
In the fifth chapter I summarize the concluding remarks of this paper with its main 
results and issues that may open the way for future work. In order to assess the methods 
applied in solving the results of the two models, refer to Appendices 1-27 at the end of 
the thesis as well as Table for the extensive notations in both models. In this paper, the 
two models which are presented in the following paragraph imply that: trade 
liberalization induces a more rapid rate of innovation distribution within an industry and 
thus increase the plant-level productivity. In addition, given a certain size of innovation, 
more liberalized trade leads to more stable industry structure from the viewpoint of 
advanced technological country. 
 
2. Research Overview 
 
In this section, I will briefly overview the most prominent literatures surround the two 
models that I have studied in this paper.  
 
I use Krugman(1980) as a building block of the literature review. Early econometric 
research (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975) reveals countries which have a very similar 
technology, a structure of factor endowment, per capital income and etc, do export the 
same kind of products to each other. For example, France and Germany buy the same 
kind of cars from one another. In other words, early empirical evidences show a huge 
amount of intra-industry trade among rich countries. Guided by this, Krugman (1980) 
develops a model with differentiated goods under increasing returns to scale with 
monopolistic competition. Specifically, unlike the traditional Ricardian model or the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, Krugman (1980) presents an analysis which incorporates the 
economies of scale, the possibility of product differentiation and imperfect competition. 
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It sheds light on the reason for intra-industry trade between similar factor endowments 
countries and also illuminates the role of large domestic market in encouraging exports. 
The basic model reveals that if trade is allowed between two imperfectly competitive 
economies, increasing returns generate trade and there are gains from trade even if the 
economies have identical tastes, technology and factor endowments. The welfare gains 
from trade accrue from the wider set of varieties available to consumers. There are two 
extensions in the following part, the first extension examines the effect of transportation 
costs and shows the larger domestic market has higher wage rates with other things 
equal. The other extension deal with ―home market‖ effects on trade patterns. It 
demonstrates the increasing returns to scale industries will tend to locate in the countries 
with the largest market, and export their goods to other countries. 
 
However, by adding new assumptions to Krugman (1980), Melitz (2003) is one of the 
most prominent papers which link the trade and productivity. In this paper, a dynamic 
industry model with heterogeneous firms is presented to investigate the intra-industry 
effects of international trade. The crucial assumptions in Krugman (1980) are that all 
firms are identical; the transportation cost is the only variable cost. However, Melitz 
(2003) relaxes these assumptions. Firms which want to export not only have to pay the 
traditional iceberg transportation costs but also face with a fixed cost. Besides, firms are 
varied with regard to productivity. These two new assumptions are consistent with the 
stylized facts: only a fraction of firms can export and firms widely differ from the 
perspectives of size and productivity within a sector. Melitz (2003) derives a simple 
model of industry equilibrium in an open economy with heterogeneous firms. For the 
trade part, it follows the model from Krugman (1980), for the industrial dynamic part, it 
builds on the bases of Hopenhayn (1992).  
 
Generally speaking, there are two main findings in Melitz (2003); first, trade opening                     
increases aggregate productivity in all trading economies. The explanation behind this is 
quite direct: exposure to trade increases the degree of competition in domestic market 
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and thus reduces the market share of domestic firms and drives down the profits for all 
firms. It is exactly the profits reduction that forces the least productive firms out of the 
market, which unambiguously boosts the aggregate productivity of the economy. The 
second contribution is that trade induces some reallocation of both market shares and 
profits among firms. That is, exporters‘ size increases and non-exporters‘ size shrinks, 
the least productive firms lose profits, and the most productive firms increase their 
profits. In addition, by adapting Hopenhayn‘s (1992) dynamic industry model with 
monopolistic competition in a generally equilibrium setting, Melitz (2003) elaborates 
that firms endogenously decide whether to stay or exit, only the firms with positive 
per-period profit will stay in the business permanently. 
  
By relaxing the constant mark-up assumption, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) build 
heterogeneous-firm trade model with endogenous mark-ups and summarize that trade 
opening increases the degree of competition in domestic country which induces a 
reduction in mark-ups and thus the increases aggregate productivity as in Melitz (2003). 
 
While Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) (henceforth BEJK (2003)) is another 
prominent article in the area of endogenous determination mark-ups. In particular, the 
model is an extension of Ricardian model of Dornbusch (1977) which introduces 
Ricardian differences in technological efficiency across firms and countries. Besides, 
BEJK (2003) regard exporting is costly; exporters have to pay the sunk costs of entry 
and the traditional transportation iceberg, which elaborates that only a fraction of firms 
can export; exporters and pure domestic producers are coexistence within an industry. 
Third, BEJK (2003) consider Bertrand competition that heterogeneous firms compete in 
prices. Since the price they charge depends on the price of their counterpart, therefore, 
mark-ups are endogenously determined. This model proves trade opening intensifies the 
competition in domestic country which induces a reduction in mark-ups and thus 
increases the aggregate productivity. Besides, as in Krugman (1980), consumers are 
benefit from trade liberalization via having a wider selection of varieties. Last but not 
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least, unlike the previous models, the gains which consumers acquired from a reduction 
in prices are partly due to the lower mark-ups charged by firms. 
 
All of the above literatures are international trade models with heterogeneous firms. 
There are some predictions which are generated from these models. First, if consumers 
appreciate variety, exposure to trade will improve welfare by offering wider selection of 
goods. In addition, trade also decreases the cost of imported goods. Therefore, 
heterogeneity does matters in terms of welfare viewpoint. Second, from the perspective 
of technology, trade liberalization can not only change the set of firms that exchange but 
also potentially increase the aggregate productivity through the reallocation of 
production. The literature of Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) has the empirical 
evidences to support of these theoretical models. Guided by Melitz (2003) and BEJK 
(2003), this literature tests the change in costs of international trade related to the U.S. 
via using a unique dataset on industry-level tariff and transportation rates. It proves that 
if industries are undergoing trade costs declining, then the plant death probability is 
higher than the probability of a plant successfully entering the export markets. In 
addition, it also reveals that falling in trade costs induce the existing exporters expand 
their foreign shipments. Finally, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) reports the evidence 
which supports the relationship of falling trade costs and the increasing in within-plant 
productivity: decreasing trade costs are in connection with the subsequent productivity 
increases for the remaining firms. 
 
However, reallocation of production is not the only way of productivity improvement in 
response to trade liberalization. Some empirical evidence also reveals plant-level 
productivity increase is a second prominent source of productivity gain for liberalized 
trade. Among them, Pavcnik (2002) is one of the most influential papers in this area. It 
finds roughly one-third of the aggregate productivity gain following from Chilean trade 
liberalization is due to within-plant productivity increase. Another paper of Trefler 
(2004) also reports the labor productivity of Canadian manufacturing plants was 
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increased 7.4 percent after the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. This finding offers us 
qualitatively evidences about how trade liberalization accelerates within-plant 
productivity gains. In addition, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) discover the evidence 
of linkage between falling trade costs and with-in productivity growth in U.S. data. 
Specifically, industry-level trade costs are negatively associated with plant-level 
productivity growth of 1 percentage drop in trade costs implying 2.3 percentage 
increases in productivity. 
 
The above literatures emphasize the impact of trade liberalization on firm-level 
productivity. However, trade liberalization also has significant influence on product life 
cycle. Specifically, according to Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), industry evolution 
always displays as the firm numbers first rising, then later falling. As stated in Gort and 
Klepper (1982) and Klepper and Grandy (1990): an industry is formed by only a small 
number of firms in its embryonic stage, and the product charges a relative high price. 
However, as entry continues, the number of producers expands and each firm produces 
more. These two phenomena together result in a dramatically rise in output and sharply 
decline in prices. In addition, output growth persists, but the growth rate in average firm 
size increases more rapidly than output growth rate so that firms must exit----a shakeout 
happens. The empirical evidences also report such shakeouts are normal phenomenon, 
as studied by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) of U.S. manufacturing industries 
over 5 years period and report rates of exit ranging from 30.8% to 39% across 
industries.
1
 Consequently, some more literatures regarding how trade liberalization 
affects product life cycle and market structure will be introduced in the following part. 
 
The subject of Jovanic and MacDonald (1994) is to analyze the dynamics evolution of 
industry. In particular, to investigate how the number of firms varies across time. The 
author uses a competitive model in which innovation opportunities fuel entry, and 
failure to innovate prompts exit to explain the shakeout phenomenon. Uncertainty plays 
                                               
1
 This example obtains from Petrakis &Roy (1999). 
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a decisive role in explaining the shakeout phenomenon. The basic mechanism is: there 
is an implementation race for adoption innovation among firms. Only a fraction of firms 
who successfully innovates growth, their output increases and prices decline. However, 
firms which have failed for mastering ‗refinement‘ technology, the market will become 
increasing unattractive and will eventually causing them exit-----a shakeout happens. 
Their model used the data from U.S. automobile tire industry to estimate and point out 
the external invention of ―Banbury mixer‖ in 1916 triggered the shakeout of automobile 
tire industry. However, Klepper and Simons (2000) criticize that it is very difficult to 
distinguish whether a single technology invention can initial a shakeout or not, since 
this ―Banbury mixer‖ is supplier good and it offered to various scale of operations.  
 
Another paper of Klepper and Simons (2005) analyzes four new products‘ market 
structures, namely automobile, tires, televisions and penicillin in U.S. domestic market. 
The unifying feature of these four industries is their population of firms had a dramatic 
decline after to the summit. The main purpose of this paper is to develop and perform 
more discriminating test of the role of innovation in industry shakeout. Klepper and 
Simons (2005) first summarize three different viewpoints on industry shakeouts. 
Specifically, they label the theory in Jovanovia and MacDonald (1994) as the radical 
invention theory, the theory in Utterback and Suarez‘s(1993) as dominant theory and 
the theory developed by Klepper (1996) as competitive advantage theory. In order to 
test and distinguish these different mechanisms, they have collected data on entry, exit 
and innovation for each product to examine the theories of industry shakeout. The basic 
conclusion from their investigation is: the rate of entry slows down around the time of 
shakeouts and eventually becomes negligible. In addition, their findings suggest 
shakeouts are not triggered by particular technological or other events but are part of a 
competitive process in which the most able early entrants achieve dominant market 
positions through innovation. 
 
- 11 - 
 
In the paper of Götz (2002), there are two more assumptions to a standard model of 
monopolistic competition: first, it limits the number of potential entrant in each period 
and assumes the population only enlarges over time. Second, potential entrants produce 
differentiated goods; they differ in terms of capabilities. Therefore, together with sunk 
costs of entry, constraints on the number of potential entrants and heterogeneity 
generate a simple model in which the entry process displays a wide range of patterns. 
The main conclusions from this paper are: the simple model result in a rich dynamic 
structure which involves the case of product life cycle, a path dependent equilibrium 
and the traditional textbook case of entry. Furthermore, the model also implies that 
having time dimension in a static model not only yields transitional dynamics but also 
has long-term consequence with the existence of sunk cost. Concerning to the policy 
implication, it is proved that there cannot be too much entry even subsidizing the entry 
of ‗inefficiency‘ firms improves welfare since it expands the number of variety 
available to consumers. Overall, this model can regard as a complement to the above 
three literature. However, Petrakis et al. (1997) and Petrakis and Roy (1999) also 
explain their models without the assumption of uncertainty. In their perfect competition 
model, shakeouts may occur as well due to the restriction on the optimum scale of 
production. Owing to learning by doing (Petrakis et al., 1997) and cost saving in R&D 
(Petakis and Roy 1999), firms alter their long run production level over time. Since the 
demand is given, the growth in firms induces dramatically decreasing in price so that 
firms may have to exit. 
 
3. Technology Adoption in a General Equilibrium Framework 
 
In this chapter I will research the results developed by Ederington and McCalman 
(2008)----Endogenous Firm Heterogeneity and the Dynamics of Trade Liberalization. 
E&M (2008) develop a dynamic model that considers firm-level productivity as 
endogenous. This framework generates that heterogeneous firms in the same industry 
operating differently in equilibrium. Under the setting of monopolistic competition, this 
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type of model yields an industry that is represented not by a steady-state outcome, but 
by an evolution that rely on the decision made by individual firms. In addition, this 
framework is a complementary analysis to the work of Melitz (2003) and BEJK (2003), 
since the models in these papers take firm-level productivity as given. In particularly, 
E&M (2008) consider firms are ex ante identical but heterogeneity arises as an 
equilibrium outcome. Therefore, this framework admits not only reshuffling effects but 
also firm-level effects in response to trade liberalization. Besides, it is worthwhile to 
mention again the heterogeneity in this whole paper refers to the fact that firm chooses 
different dates to adopt innovation and hence they are heterogeneous in terms of 
productivity. Furthermore, due to fact that firms which choose to export will naturally 
choose to adopt new technology earlier in the diffusion process than the non-exporters, 
this endogenous technology adoption model is also capable to capture the stylized facts: 
exporting firms are larger and more productive than their non-exporting counterparts in 
the same sector. Therefore, the model presented in E&M (2008) can be considered as a 
complement to the standard self-selection model. I will present this model from two 
sources. Götz (1999)----Monopolistic competition and the diffusion of new technology 
will be used, as well as E&M (2008). I will present the model with both the closed 
economy and open economy case. 
 
3.1. The Closed Economy Equilibrium 
 
In this section, a closed economy model of endogenous technology adoption developed 
by E&M (2008) is introduced. The starting point of the model is the market is 
characterized by the monopolist competition. To formalize the concept of monopolistic 
competition, Götz (1999) adopts the derivation of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence 
(1976). This ―large group‖ assumption (Chamberlin, 1965) guarantees there is no 
strategic interaction among firms. In addition, the price elasticity of demand is constant, 
and thus it is independent of market size. Nevertheless, due to individual firm producing 
differentiated goods, they have the monopolistic power to set up their own price. 
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Besides, this kind of industry structure also allows us to circumvent the question that 
whether or not firms commit to adopting the advanced technology, since in equilibrium 
all firms earn the same profits. This standard game-theoretical model is initially 
proposed by Reinganum (1981) and extended by Götz (1999). The model presents here 
uses a setting similar to Götz (1999). In this section that follows, E&M (2008) consider 
the basic model of technology diffusion under the model of intra-industry trade. 
 
3.1.1. Market Demand Conditions  
 
The evolution of an industry is modelled in continuous time. There are two sectors in 
the economy; one sector consists of a numeraire good    while the other sector is 
characterized by differentiated varieties. Assuming the number of firms is constant and 
there is no per-period fixed cost in this chapter. However, these assumptions will be 
relaxed to show how exposure to trade affects the industrial dynamics and shapes the 
structure of market in chapter four. 
 
The preference ordering of identical consumer is described by the intertemporal utility 
function: 
 
                 
 
 
                                                                  
 
where   (t) is the consumption of the numeraire good in time t and      is an index of 
consumption of the Dixit-Stigliz type, which also implies      is the CES function and 
has a constant elasticity of substitution between any pair of the goods: 
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where        denotes the demand for brand   at time   by an arbitrage consumer,   
represents the total number of varieties in time  . 
The price of product   at time   is        . Assuming the number of consumer is   
and each consumer‘s cost on differentiated good equals to 1. Therefore,   represents 
the total instantaneous expenditure on the differentiated good. Under these assumptions, 
the household will maximize their intertemporal utility function (1) subject to the 
instantaneous budget constraint: 
 
                               
 
 
                                                        
  refers to total expenditure on differentiated goods.  
The Lagrangen corresponding to this maximization is:  
 
                                          
 
 
    
 
this yields the aggregate demand function        for the brand   at time  : 
 
(4)                 
         
            
 
 
                                                                           
 
The conduct of equation (4) is presented in Appendix 1. This price elasticity of this 
demand function is        . The price will be changed by the actions of rivals 




Labor is the only input for all production and all goods are using constant returns to 
scale technologies. Thus only a certain amount of labor is needed for produce per unit of 
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output. For simplicity, assuming the production of numeraire goods is in competitive 
market, which is defined by      and this ensures wage is equal to the cost 
(nominative to 1) in equilibrium. For the differentiated sector, assuming there are two 
types of technology coexisting in the industry, namely, low/high type. The low type of 
technology is available to all firms at the time     and the cost of low-type 
technology is constant over time, which is defined by          . The high type of 
cost-saving technology is also available at time    , but adopting this kind of 
technology requires additional cost     , which is decreasing and convex in   so that 
         and         ,        and       , this illustrates the cost of 
adoption is decreasing across time, early adoption is more expensive, but finally all 
firms will adopt the new technology. The high type of technology is defined by       
       , where     which elaborates the cost of production is decreased by the 
innovation. 
 
According to the demand function of (4), the Dixit-Stiglitz preference leads to a simple 
mark-up pricing rule for profit-maximizing firms. Consequently, the prices for low-tech 
and high-tech firms are: 
 
               
 
   
        
 
      
                                
 
The conduct of equation (5) is presented in Appendix 2. 
 
The profit differential between low-tech (    and high-tech (    firms is 
 
                        
         
 
   
 
   
 




                                                
 
The conduct of equation (6) is presented in Appendix 3.  
Let            denotes the fraction of firms that have already adopted 
high-productivity technology, the price index is: 
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The conduct of equation (7) is presented in Appendix 4.  
 
Substituting (7) into (6) yields the profit differential as:  
 
                        
         
               
                                       
 
The conduct of equation (8) is presented in Appendix 5. The profit differential is 
decreasing as the number of firms using high-tech production   increases. This is due 
to the fact that, the adoption of innovation by rival firms reduces the market share of the 
other firms, and thus the gains from adopting also decline. Therefore, firms should 
tradeoff the increased operation profits from the early adoption against the lower 
adoption costs of later adoption. It is exactly this tradeoff leads to the adoption of 
innovation is sequential rather than simultaneous within a sector. 
 
3.1.3 Adoption Decision 
 
The equilibrium distribution of technologies      is derived by the individual firm‘s 
choice of the optimal adoption date. Assuming a firm chooses the optimal adoption 
date   to maximize the discounted value of total profits: 
 
           
    
 
 
             
    
 
 
                  .   
             
     is the additional cost of adopt high technology,    equals to the sunk costs of 
entry. The total profits depend on both the firm‘s own adoption date,    and the 
adoption dates of its rivals summarized by the distribution function     . Since the 
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distribution function      is in continuous time, totally differentiating it with respect to 
  yields the first-order condition: 
 
                                       
                                                
 
The conduct of equation (9) is presented in Appendix 6. The left-hand side term is the 
profit that earned of early adoption whereas the right-hand side is the decreasing cost of 
late adoption. Firms have to tradeoff the high profit of early adoption and the low cost 
of late adoption. Insert (8) into (9) yields:  
 
               
         
               
               
 
Therefore, the equilibrium distribution function of      can be solved by (11): 
 




                                                       
      
       
 
 
      
                   
                                                        
           
 
This distribution function illustrates the process of technological progress in a closed 
economy. Figure 1 describes this diffusion process. Given the initially high cost of 
adoption, no firm adopts earlier than   . As the adoption cost decreases over time, firms 
gradually adopt in         and finally all firms employ the new technology after   . 
For the period          there coexists both high-tech and low-tech firms, 
















                  











Figure 1: Equilibrium distribution of technology adoption 
 
3.1.4. Zero-Profit Entry Conditions 
 
The model can be closed by calculating the equilibrium number of firms  . In the 
setting of perfect information, forward-looking firms will entry to the industry until the 
present value of profits equals to zero. Since there is no fixed cost in each period, the 
per-period profit is bound to be positive in every period. For a firm adopts new 






      
      
 
          
 
                  
                 
note: 
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Substituting in the respective profits function, one derives the zero-profit condition as: 
 
              
                
   
 
       
        
      
                        
 
The conduct of equation (13) is presented in Appendix 7. The above zero-profit 
condition implicitly defines the number of firms  . A straightforward application of 
envelop theorem verifies that equilibrium profits are declining in   2 Given the entry 
occurs until the present value of profits becomes to zero, this zero-profits condition 
along with       characterizes the closed economy equilibrium. 
 
3.2. The Open Economy Equilibrium  
 
In this part, the model will be extended in the open economy setting to investigate the              
effect of exposure to trade on technological diffusion between two symmetric countries 
in a differentiated industry. From the perspective of firms, trade liberalization not only 
creates opportunity to export but also invites foreign competition to domestic market. 
All of these factors alter a firm‘s profits and affect the entry and technology adoption 
decision. In order to consistent with empirical evidence, assuming exporters have to pay 
                                               
2
 Proof:           is the firm‘s value function, totally differentiated it   yields:  
                                  
  
   
    
  
   
    
  
  
    
But 
  
   
 
  
   
   by the first-order condition. Therefore the envelop theorem implies: 






   
Note that the first-order condition ensures that changes in adoption dates do not affect the present discounted value of profits 
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some fixed costs   for exporting. The fixed costs S including the need of obtain 
information in foreign country; the necessary change about a product´s characteristic to 
suit the foreign market and so on. It is the presence of such fixed costs of entering 
foreign market makes the firms self-select to export or not. Only the most productive 
firms which could afford the extra fixed costs S are able to export.     is used to denote 
the fraction of firms of exporters. This assumption also in line with the empirical 




These the high productive firms could reap benefits from trade opening (through an 
increased demand for their goods from foreign market). By contrast, the non-exporters 
suffer from the increased competition in domestic market, and thus reduce their market 
share. Besides, assuming the decision to export occur at     as firms have paid off 
the initial export costs   for simplicity. 
 
However, except the fixed export costs, exporters also face per-unit cost (i.e., the 
traditional iceberg or tariff) which is denoted by     for unit of good, this results in 
the exporters setting higher prices in foreign markets to reflect their higher marginal 
costs, while each firm‘s pricing rule in the domestic market still expresses by (5), the 
prices for serving foreign markets of low and high technology of export firms are: 
 
                 
   
  
   
                  
  
  
      
                                                   
 
The quantity of brands which is available in a market also increases compared to the 
autarky case. Now, there are total   available varieties including   domestic brands 
and    foreign brands in a representative country. 
 
The profit differential for low-tech (  
   and high-tech (  
   exporters is given by: 
  
                                               
3 See the reference of Firms in international trade for detailed empirical evidence. 
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The conduct of equation (15) is presented in Appendix 8.  
 
The profit differential for non-exporters is showed by (6) (please note the total varieties 
change from n into  ) 
 
            
        
      
         
 
    
   
 




        
 
In the previous section, it is assumed there is no per-period fixed cost; a firm‘s profits 
(both foreign and domestic) are bounded to be positive in each period. This assumption 
guarantees once the sunk costs of entry    have been paid, no firm has an incentive to 
exit from neither the domestic nor the foreign market (i.e., in equilibrium the number 
firms    and the fraction of exporters    are not varied over time). Besides, E&M 
(2008) also assume all the entry will occur at     for simplicity. Intuitively, the 
positive per-period profit along with the rational, forward-looking firms indicate the 
industry which is discussed in E&M (2008) has the stable structure (the number of firms 
in an industry is constant). In addition, the stable structure in this whole paper signifies 
the sunk costs of entry    are sufficiently large. In particular, in this section, the 
industry structure E&M (2008) argue is: has sufficiently large sunk costs of entry and 
no per-period fixed cost. Nevertheless, in chapter 4, these conditions will be relaxed. In 
particular, per-period fixed cost will be incorporated and show that in equilibrium the 
stable industry is featured by the fixed cost of production relative small to the sunk costs 
of entry. Therefore, the conclusions of this part are applying to the stable industry where 
the sunk costs of entry are sufficiently large. However, even though   and    are 
time-invariant in this set-up, they are endogenous and respond to changes in trade costs 
(although these adjustments will occur at time zero). 
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3.2.1. Adoption Decision  
 
From the first-order condition, which is showed in (9), the first main result of this paper 
is established: 
 
Proposition 1. Exporting firms adopt innovation earlier in equilibrium than 
non-exporters. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 9. 
 
Proposition 1 reflects the fact that exporting firms, in general, more productive than 
non-exporters at any point of diffusion process. This can be easily derived as follows: 
                   
            
It is straightforward known         at any point of diffusion process. This reality  
reveals that exporting firms, due primarily to their larger scale effect from operating the 
multiple markets, they gain more by adopting innovation since it helps them lower the 
production costs, increase the profits, and thus make them automatically choose to 
adopt new technology earlier in the diffusion process. Consequently, the rational, 
forward-looking firms that choose to export will naturally and simultaneously choose to 
adopt innovation more rapidly. In addition, the fact of          , illuminates 
exporters are more productive than non-exporters. This recurs the empirical finding of 
exporting firms are, on average, more productive and larger than non-exporters (see 
Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999; Clerides et al., 1998; Baldwin and Gu, 2003). 
Furthermore, it should be notice that this positive relationship of exporting and 
productivity is not caused by the learning by doing or positive feedback of exporting 
action to production function, but only due to the fact that firms choose to export will 
automatically decide to adopt at a faster rate.  
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Now, the equilibrium technology diffusion rate      in an open-economy setting can 
be derived. The heterogeneity here refers to firms are different in terms of exporting 
choice (exporter or non-exporter) as well as the technology state (high-tech or low-tech). 
Exporting firms gain profits from both domestic and foreign market, and according to 
Proposition 1, they adopt new technology earlier than non-exporters, which means in 
the range of          (i.e., when the number of high-tech firms is less than the 
exporters) the exporter adopts the innovation. Given the symmetric condition, 
            
           the price index for a representive country is (for      
  ): 
  
                    
  
 
        
           
       
              
              
 
Substituting this price index into the profit differential given by (15) yields: 
 
             
       
     
                 
                           
     
                                                     
 
Note that the profit differential   
    
  is decreasing function as the number of firms 
adopts high technology   increases. The adoption of cost-saving innovation by rival 
firms leads to the market share of the other firms reduces and thus lowers the gain of 
adoption. Insert the equation (18) into (9) yields optimal date for exporters in the range 
of        : 
 
                 
     
       
 
     
   
                
  For   [                               
 
The conduct of equations (17)-(19) are presented in Appendix 10.     means                                
the first export firm adopts high-productivity technology at that time,   stands for the 
adoption date for last exporter. In other words, no exporter adopts later than  . Besides, 
holding the number of firms ( ) constant, compare (11) & (19) yields: 
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This directly illustrates trade speeds up the adoption rate for exporters. The reason 
behind this is straightforward: exposure to international trade enables exporters has 
access to the foreign market, this increased market size enhances their incentive to adopt 
new technology and thus accelerates the adoption rate. 
 
Similarly, the price index for the range of         is: 
 
                 
  
 
       
           
          
         
 
The adoption decision for non-exporters happen in the time interval of        ], 
inserting the price index in the range of         into (16) yields the profit 
differential for non-exporters: 
 
            
        
      
         
                   
         
                                 
 
Inserting (20) into (9) yields the distribution function for the non-exporters in the range 
of         (the number of high-tech firms is more than the exporters): 
 
                 
     
       
 
     
       
        
   For                                             
 
The conduct of equations (20) & (21) is presented in Appendix 11. If holding the 
number of firms ( ) constant, compare  (11) & (21) yields: 
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This straightforward shows that trade decreases the rate of adoption for non-exporters. 
Exposure to trade increases the degree of competition in domestic market and thus 
reduces the market share of non-exporters without any compensating in foreign market. 
This decreased market size reduces the incentives of non-exporters to adopt the new 
technology and thus decelerates the adoption rate. 
 
Combine (19) & (21), the following function is an equilibrium distribution of new 
technology diffusion in an open economy setting: 
 








                                                                             
      
       
 
     
   
                
                      
                                                                                               
      
       
 
     
       
        
                               
                                                                                
  
 
The Figure 2 explains how new technology diffusion across firms in open economy 
case. Before the time of    , no firm adopts the advanced technology since it is 
extremely expensive (the adoption fee now is        . But as the adoption cost falls, 
exporters gradually to use this new technology in the period of       , the first-order 
condition (9) guarantees the exporting firms are indifferent between adoptions or not at 
any dates during this range. Then there is lull in the time of       . After this, 
non-exporters start to adopt the cost-saving technology and they finish their adoption in 
the period of        . Again, the first-order condition (9) guarantees the non-exporting 
firms are indifferent between adoptions or not at any dates during this range. By the 
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           Figure2: equilibrium distribution function with exporters/non-exporters 
 
From the distribution function (22), it is obviously known that the changes in trade costs 
of   affect the diffusion rate. Holding   and    constant, differentiate (19) & (21) 
with respect to the variable trade costs  , we can derive the direct effect of increase in b 
on the adoption decision for both exporters and non-exporters. Thus, the following 
proposition is stated: 
 
Proposition 2. Holding   and    constant, lower trade costs (i.e, a lower  ) will 
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Proof: See Appendix 12. 
 
Trade has different effects on the rate of adoption for different types of firms. For 
exporters, lowering trade barriers tend to speed up the rate of adoption. Exporters have 
larger markets; this expanded scale increases their incentives for adoption new 
technology and accelerates diffusion rate. By contrast, the decreased trade costs for 
non-exporters work in the opposite way. Lowering trade costs not only encourage 
foreign competitors enter into the domestic market but also reduce the prices of foreign 
goods, which increase the degree of competition in domestic market and reduce the 
market share of non-exporters without of any compensating in foreign market. In other 
words, trade liberalization has a negative effect on non-exporters since it slows down 
the adoption rate and reduces their profits as well. Besides, from (11) and (19) it is 
directly to derive            given the number of domestic firms in open economy 
is less than   in the closed economy equilibrium. This elaborates the adoption 
date    in open economy equilibrium happens earlier than   in closed economy 
equilibrium. The explanation of this is straightforward; trade opening not only expands 
the market size of exporters which enable them to entering to foreign market but also 
decreases the number of domestic firms. These two factors together encourage exporters 
adapt innovation at earlier dates. Nevertheless, trade has an ambiguous influence on 
adoption decision of non-exporters. It increases the degree of domestic competition 
which reducing the market share of domestic non-exporters, while simultaneously 
lowering the number of domestic firms which in turn accelerates the adoption rate of 
non-exporter. Therefore, these two opposing factors determine trade has an obscure 
effect on non-exporters. 
 
However, it should be noticed that the above analysis is not complete since it ignores 
trade also has the indirect effect. The change in trade variable of   also affects the 
equilibrium value of   and   . Consequently, in the next part, E&M (2008) endogenize 
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the entry and exit decisions of firms to determine the overall impact of trade on firm‘s 
productivity. 
 
3.2.2. Zero-Profit Entry Conditions 
 
Similar to section 3.1.4., this model can be closed by solving the equilibrium number of 
firms   and the fraction of exporter   . Because the profit is bounded to be positive in 
each period, firms once enter to the market will stay in the industry permanently. 
However, the entry into both the domestic and foreign markets will be ended until to the 
total present value of profits equals to zero. Entering the industry requires for the sunk 
costs of    , whereas entering to the foreign market requires additional costs of   . 
Supposing an arbitrage export firm adopts innovation at the first opportunity (i.e., at the 
time of    ), thus, the present value of profits for an exporter is: 
 












          








                                       
 
Substituting in the respective profits function, one derives the zero-profit condition for 
an exporter is: 
 
             
             
        
 
               
                    
 
         
   
   
                              
       
       
      
     
                        
      
                                          
 
The conduct of equation (23) is presented in Appendix 13. 
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Assuming an arbitrage non-exporter adopts new technology at the last opportunity (i.e., 
at the time of   ), the present value of profits for a non-exporter is: 
 












           








                    
 
Similar calculations reveal the zero-profits condition for non-exporters is: 
 
                
             
        
 
         
                    
 
 
   
 
                                  
          
                
   
              
      
                             
 
The conduct of equation (24) is presented in Appendix 14. These respective zero-profits 
conditions are plotted in Figure 3. The line of exporter (non-exporter) combines   and 
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Totally differentiated the present value of profits for exporter and non-exporter, a 
straightforward and tedious calculation yields: 
 
                   
  
   
  
       
    
  
       
  
                  
 
The conduct of equation (25) is presented in Appendix 15. This implies the zero-profit 
lines are downward sloping. Another tedious calculation proves the slope of zero-profits 
line for exporter is steeper than that of non-exporter. This suggests there is unique 
interaction between them. In other words, for a given value to the parameters, a unique 
equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if the size of sunk costs of exporting   is sufficient low 
which involving every firm to export       . By contrast, if   sufficient high which 
leads to no firm exports      , or for a medium sunk costs of exporting  , there is an 
interior equilibrium existing where there is a fraction of firms exporting, which is 
      . E&M (2008) concentrates on the last case of only a portion of firms are 
exporters, since this is the most practical and empirical case according to empirical 
findings. 
 
In the closed economy setting, the number of firm   is decided by the zero-profit line 
for non-exporter       . Nevertheless, from the Figure 3, in the open economy 
setting, it is apparent that the number of domestic firms   is less than the closed 
economy case. Besides, if we take derivative to the equation (22) with respect to  , this 
yields: 
     
  
  , this illustrates the adoption rate is decreasing in  , the reduction in the 
number of domestic firms serves to increase the adoption rate. 
 
As it is showed in Figure 3, the equibilirium value of    and   are resolved by the 
interaction of the two zero-profit lines. To determine the total impact of trade on 
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  and    , note that when     ,       for a non-exporter, I have the following 
derivations: 
 
                                  
 
   
 
              
      
     
 
It is independent of   on the condition when     . While at            then: 
 
           
             
      
 
         
            
 
 
   
 
                          
          
                
           
 
Which illustrates at       
    
  
  , this implies    is increasing in     
However, when            and the present value of profits for an exporter is: 
 
                                        
         
   
 
                     
                        
      
             
 
Take derivative with respect to   , yields 
   
  
  . Similarly, at             
  
                         
               
    
 
 
   
 
                        
       
         
      
        
 
Which is independent of   at     . The detailed derivations are presented in the 
Appendix 16. This mechanism is captured in Figure 4. The intuitive behind this is: the 
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decreased trade barriers increase the exporters‘ profits, which raise the incentives for 
firms to enter into the export markets and thus lead to the fraction of exporters‘    
increases. Likewise, the decreased trade costs of   reduce the profits of non-exporters 




                















Figure4: Liberalization decreases the number of firms but raises the share of exporter in equilibrium 
 
However, it is also worthwhile to note, there still exist some direct effects which 
counter these indirect effects. In particular, the increase in exporters‘ profits is matched 
by a growth in the number of firms‘ export which in turn reduces the oversea market 
profits. Likewise, the decrease in non-exporter profits which is caused by declining 
trade barriers is countered by a contracting in the number of domestic firms, thus 
increase the remaining firms‘ domestic profits. Considering all these differential effects, 
a question naturally arises to our mind: what is the overall impact of trade liberalization 
on the technology diffusion for both exporters and non-exporters? This question induces 
the following proposition: trade liberalization tends to speed up the adoption rate for all 
types of firms which lead to the adoption starting earlier and ending earlier. 
n 
   
     low b 
       high b  
Exporter       
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Proposition 3. Lower variable trade costs (i.e., a lower  ) will result in the process of 
adoption starting earlier (i.e.,   will occur earlier) and ending later. (i.e.,   will 
occur earlier). 
 
Proof: See Appendix 17. 
 
The direct implication of Proposition 3 is: international trade, in general, has positive 
effect on firm‘s productivity as it makes the new technology diffusion starting earlier 
and ending earlier compared to autarky situation. In other words, if two countries are 
identical in all respects other than the size of trade barriers, the innovation diffusion 
occurs more rapidly in low trade barrier country. Specifically, the new technology 
diffusion will be both starting and ending earlier in low trade barriers country. In fact, it 
is not surprising trade has positive impact on exporters‘ productivity; however, from 
Proposition 3, the lower trade barriers also promote the adoption rate for non-exporters. 
It seemingly has contradiction with Proposition 2 which implies the liberalization 
decreases the rate of new technology adoption for non-exporters. The explanation for 
this paradoxical result is determined by the relative impact of direct and indirect effect 
of trade liberalization on endogenous adoption decision. To be precisely, the decline in 
trade barriers leads to the contraction of industry (i.e., the number of domestic firms n 
decreases), which in turn speeds up the adoption rate of all firms, particularly for the 
late adopters. In fact, there are two countervailing indirect effects, the increase in    
slows down the adoption rate whereas the decrease in   accelerates adoption rate. The 
key insight is the impact of trade barriers is not constant over time. During the diffusion 
process, both exporters and non-exporters have similarly technology (either all low-tech 
or all high-tech) in the period of         and        , this symmetric condition 
illustrates at this time trade barriers have the negative effect on adoption for all firms: 
trade barriers are impediment to foreign competition. However, in the middle of 
diffusion process (when        ), there is asymmetric situation between exporters 
and non-exporters, exporting firms have already adopted high technology and thus 
enjoy a relative cost advantage. It is this condition that make tariffs relative important 
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for domestic firms, especially low-tech non-exporters who are now more rely on tariffs 
for survival, since trade barriers at the interval of       for non-exporters are a 
protection which can shift the competition away from foreign competitors. However, 
the present value of profits is constrained to be zero in equilibrium; the impact of tariff 
over time has important implication for the evolution of profits. Reducing tariff makes 
the loss in the middle of diffusion process, since the zero-profits condition must be 
holds, the loss will be compensated by gains during the symmetric period. Consequently, 
when trade barriers   decrease,        and         must be both higher in 
equilibrium. In addition, as it is stated in Lemma 1,    and    are determined by 
       and         , the higher profits of         and         elaborate 
adoption starting earlier and ending sooner when tariffs are liberalized. 
 
3.2.3. Sunk Cost of Exporting 
 
Generally speaking, not only the variable trade barriers (i.e., reciprocal tariff reduction) 
can be reduced in a reciprocal trade agreement, it also contains the reduction in the fixed 
costs of exporting (i.e., lower costs of entry  ). Consequently, in this part, the effect of 
decrease in fixed costs of exporting   on the equilibrium rate of adoption will be 
analyzed. From the distribution function (22), it is straightforward to know the change 
in sunk costs of exporting ( ) does not directly affect the adoption rate     , but it does 
have the indirect effect. The change in sunk costs of exporting ( ) will alter the 
equibilibrium values of   and    and thus lead to the change in adoption rate. The 
decrease in   will raise the present value of profits for an exporter. However, in 
equilibrium, the total present value of exporters still constraint to be zero. Consequently, 
there is an increase in the number of exporters (i.e.,    increased) along with the 
diminish in n which is showed in Figure5. As stated in the following proposition, the 
net impact of the reduction in sunk costs of exporting ( ) is it speeds up adoption rate 
for all types of firms. 
 
















            Figure 5: decease in sunk cost of exporting 
 
Proposition 4. A reduction in the sunk cost of exporting (i.e., a decrease in S) can result 
in the process of adoption starting earlier (i.e.,   will occur earlier) and ending earlier 
(i.e.,   will occur earlier) 
 
Proof: See Appendix 18. 
 
The explanation behind the Proposition 4 is similar to Proposition 3. The only 
difference is the change in sunk costs of exporting ( ) do not directly affect the adoption 
rate. The adoption rate is entirely interact by the change in   and   . Once again, in the 
period of        and        , both exporters and non-exporters have similarly 
technology (either all low-tech or all high-tech), the fixed trade costs   hinder the 
technology diffusion. However, the changes in   has greater impact than the change in 
   in symmetric technology diffusion, therefore, the decrease in   increases firm‘s 
profits and speeds up the adoption rates. This effect operates for both the first and the 
last adopter, consequently, a reduction in the fixed cost of exporting leads to the 
adoption process not only starting earlier but also ending earlier. 
   
  
non-exporter     








E&M (2008) have derived some important results in their paper. The main focus of their 
model is to investigate the impact of trade liberalization on technology adoption rates 
within an industry. The starting point of their model is constructed of an industry 
involving constant number of firms so as to understand the implications of the trade 
policy thoroughly. The new technology diffusion plays the key role in industrial 
evolution as it increases the plant-level productivity. E&M (2008) consider the 
innovation diffusion across firms is not simultaneous but sequential. It is exactly this 
sequential diffusion process induces the persistent productivity differences among firms 
within a sector. In other words, this gradual dispersed innovation generates an important 
source of heterogeneity: firms differ in term of ability to adoption technology. Based on 
this, E&M (2008) develop a model of firm‘s heterogeneity is an equilibrium outcome. 
In addition, by using this model, E&M (2008) found that lowering trade barriers 
accelerate technology adoption rates and thus increase the firm-level productivity within 
a sector. In particular, it is not surprising declining trade barriers speed up the 
technology diffusion rates among exporters, but it also hastens the diffusion rates for 
non-exporters. In other words, exposure to trade makes the technology diffusion process 
both start earlier and ends earlier. Furthermore, E&M (2008) model is also able to 
replicate a number of empirical findings. They have proved the stylized fact of exporters 
tend to be larger and more productive than non-exporters. E&M (2008) is regarded as a 
complement to the influential and emerging line of research that assumes productivity 
varies exogenously across firms and focuses on the impact of trade on industry-level 
productivity. The basic conclusion from E&M (2008) is trade tends to facilitate 
technology diffusion rate, that is, both exporters and non-exporters have more rapid 
adoption rates in more liberalized trade environment. 
 
In the following chapter, in order to consistent with research works have been done, an 
extension from E&M (2009) will be introduced. 
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4. Trade Liberalization and Industrial Dynamics 
 
In the previous section, it has been proved trade liberalization can hasten new 
technology diffusion across an industry and hence increase the aggregate industry 
productivity. However, this analysis is incomplete since it assumes the number of firms 
within a sector is constant. In fact, the industrial evolution shows considerably different 
patterns across countries. Some industries experience a large scale of firms exit in the 
period of contracting market shares, while some industries display relative stable 
number of firms or gradually increase quantities. The special word ―shakeout‖ is used to 
describe the dramatic decrease in the number of firms. An industry named U.S. 
automobile is a leading example of exit phenomenon. The number of firms climbed 
sharply to a peak of 274 in 1909, and then experienced a dramatic fall to 121 by 1918.
4
 
Another striking example is the U.S. automobile tire industry studied by Jovanovic and 
MacDonald (1994) and Klepper and Simons (2000). According to their research: the 
number of firms reached to the peak of 276 in 1922. However, the number of firms 
subsequently declined sharply, falling to 50 by 1936.
5
 The third intriguing example is 
the evolution of the market structure in the synthetic dye industry, studying by 
Murmann and Homburg (2001). France, Britain and Germany were the three major 
countries entry to synthetic dye industry in the mid 1850s. The number of French firms‘ 
displayed a steep rise from 1858-1862, but after reached to the peak the number 
dramatically decreased, whereas the market structure of this industry in Britain revealed 
a relatively small fluctuation, and in Germany, it showed the long rise in the numbers.  
 
On the basis of the above facts, questions are naturally raised up, why such shakeouts 
do not happen, for example in the gas turbine industry? Why synthetic dye industry is 
stable in Germany and Britain but shows dramatic change in France? What are the 
determinants driving such profound shifts in market structure? Understanding the 
                                               
4 From the reference of innovation and industry shakeout. Business and Economic History, 1996 - 128.113.2.9 
5 From the reference of innovation and industry shakeout. Business and Economic History, 1996 - 128.113.2.9 
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causes of shakeouts may provide us some insights into the broader question of what are 
the factors of shaping an industry structure, a long-standing interest topic in industrial 
organization. A number of literature (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1978; Flaherty, 1980; 
Metcalfe and Gibbons, 1988) have claimed that technological change plays a significant 
role in shaping market structure. Based on these literatures, E&M (2009) build a model 
which is capable to generate a shakeout endogenously and regard it as an equilibrium 
outcome so as to grasp the insight of shakeout. In particular, they develop a model 
where forward-looking firms are endogenously decided to enter and exit the market on 
the basis of their state of technology. In equilibrium, firms choose different dates to 
adopt innovation which generate a gradual diffusion process. It is exactly this gradual 
diffusion process that generates the rapid, large-scale exit phenomenon. Specifically, it 
demonstrates that a group of firms that make the decision to exit will stimulate the 
remaining firms to increase their speed to adopt new technology, which in turn cause 
more firms exit (i.e., a shakeout happens). In other words, there is a feedback between 
firm exit and firm adoption. Therefore, in the setting of complete information, this 
model is able to generate a shakeout where firms are forward looking. 
 
Howbeit, it also worthwhile to note this model not only can generate a shakeout but also 
can capture the stability of an industry. The characteristic of stable industry in this 
whole paper is determined by interaction between technological change and the 
composition cost. Namely, for a given size of innovation, the higher size of entry costs 
relative to the fixed costs, the harder to trigger a shakeout. This result illuminates the 
flexible industry (experience a shakeout industry) may not only undergo technological 
change but also have low sunk entry costs (relative to the per-period cost). In addition, it 
vividly depicts a dramatic innovation will have little effect on the market structure if 
entry costs are very large but a small technology upgrading can generate a large scale of 
exit with the condition of low entry costs. Generally speaking, it explicates 
technological change may not sufficient for triggering a shakeout. 
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In order to explain how shakeout is influenced by global competition, E&M (2009) 
consider the case where countries are different with regard to technology level. This 
asymmetric assumption is inspired by the synthetic dye example. Under this setting, 
how trade barriers affect the likelihood and location of shakeout is investigated. 
Specifically, it is proved in E&M (2009) the higher trade barriers the more fragile 
markets, which encouraging the over-entry in the initial stage of industry life cycle and 
raising the probability of a shakeout. In more fragmented markets, for an innovation of 
given size, it has more deeply impact on the profits of technological lagging firms 
compare to the frontiers‘ and raises the chances for technological lagging firms to 
experience negative profits and thus makes them exit. Therefore, E&M (2009) argue 
that more liberalized trade generates more stable market structure from both national 
and international perspectives. 
 
Regarding to the location of shakeouts, it is showed the technological behind countries 
always suffer from a larger exit than the advanced country. This is consistent with the 
technological asymmetric assumption. In fact, for a large range of parameter values, the 
advanced country has a relatively stable market structure. These conclusions are 
completely distinct compare to the closed economy case. The same conditions which 
generate a shakeout in autarky setting are associated with a constant number of firms for 
advanced country in the open economy. This explains freer trade can result in more 
stable industry from the perspective of a technology advanced country. Consequently, 
the past literatures which only concentrate on national perspective view are not 
comprehensive, since there are few industries with the characteristic of no international 
trade. The introduction of trade adds prominent dimension to analyze the industrial 
dynamics and understand the shape of market structure. 
 
In this whole chapter four, an autarky economy model of industrial evolution which is 
originated by technology adoption will be first presented in section 4.1. And in section 
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4.2., the model will be extended in the open economy case to analyze how exposure to 
trade affects the industrial evolution. 
 
4.1. Shakeouts in a Closed Economy 
 
An industry is created at      with some basic technology. The cost-saving 
technology is also available at     but with extremely high adoption fee. However, 
adoption cost is assumed to be falling over time. It is exactly this gradually diffusion 
process drives the industry evolution. The model presents here uses a setting similar to 
Götz (1999) which consider the endogenous adoption decisions. The main contribution 
of this part is proved how directly modification of technology diffusion model can 
generate shakeouts in the industry. 
 
4.1.1. Market Demand Conditions 
 
The marker demand conditions are exactly same with the section 3.1.1. There are two 
sector in the economy, one is the homogeneous sector, the other is produced the 
differentiated goods. The aggregate demand function        for the brand   at time   is 
still show by (4): 
 
                     
         
            
 
 
                     
 
This demand function is stable which illustrates there is no fluctuation in demand side. 
Therefore, the supply-side is the underlie factors that trigger shakeouts which is 
consistent with the literature.  
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4.1.2. Production Costs 
 
The production cost is slightly different compared to section 3.1.2. Labor is still the 
only input for production, after paying off sunk entry costs of    firms can enter to the 
industry. There still exist two types of technology. The rudimentary technology is 
available at the time     for every firm upon entering the industry. However, the 
cost-saving innovation is also available at the time     but adoption this innovation 
requires additional cost      where          and         . In addition, assuming 
production with low type of technology is defined by            , where   is the 
per-period fixed cost of production. Production using the innovation is defined 
by                , where      which illuminates the cost of production is 
decreased by the innovation. Compared to section 3.1.2, E&M (2009) model adds the 
assumption of per-period fixed cost  .  
 
Given the Dixit-Stiglitz preference, profit-maximizing firms‘ prices for low-tech and 
high-tech firms are still respectively showing by (5): 
 
                 
 
   
          
 
      
     
 
Consequently the profit differential between the low-tech (    firm and the high-tech 
(    firm is also showing by (6) in section 3.1.2: 
 
                        
         
 
   
 
   
 




                                                    
 
The         still denotes the fraction of firms which have adopted high technology at 
a point in time, consequently, the price index in also given by (7): 
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Substituting (7) into (6) yields the profit differential which is also showing by (8): 
 
                        
         
               
       
 
The profit differential         is decreasing function in  . The adoption by rival firms 
reduces the market share of the other firms, as well as decreases the profits gaining from 
adopting the innovation. Firms should tradeoff the increased operation profits from the 
early adoption against the lower adoption costs of later adoption, it is exactly this reason 
leads to the gradual diffusion of technology within the sector. 
 
4.1.3. Technological Progress 
 
In section 3, there is no per-period cost in the profit function and the number of firms is 
constant. In this part, these assumptions are relaxed while other assumptions are exactly 
the same. The per-period fixed cost is denoted by  , the discounted value of total profits 
is showed as follows: 
 
                 
 
 
                
    
 
 
                        
 
A firm chooses the optimal adoption date  , to maximize the discounted value of total 
profits. Differentiating it with respected to   yields the F.O.C: 
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This is the same F.O.C with equation (9) in section 2. The explanation to (31) is also the 
similar to (9). An early adoption confers a greater profit increase but is associated with a 
higher adoption cost, while a later adoption involves a lower profit differential but also 
a lower the opportunity cost of waiting.   
 
However, if the per-period fixed cost   is sufficiently low, so that the per-period profit 
is bounded to be positive. Therefore, firms will stay in the industry permanently (i.e., 
for sufficient low  ,         for all  ). No firm has the incentive to exit from the 
industry once they entered; the number of firms is still constant. Insert the profits 
differential function (8) into the F.O.C of (31) yields the equilibrium distribution 
function       
 




                                                       
      
       
 
 
      
                   
                                                         
   
 
This is exactly the same equilibrium distribution function of (11) in section 3.This 
distribution function describes the industry evolution in a closed economy case. With 
initial high adoption cost, no firm uses the innovation before   . Nevertheless, as the 
adoption cost gradually decreases, adoption becomes commercially viable; 
consequently, there is a gradual diffusion process through the industry for periods     
     . Finally, all firms become high-tech after   . 
 
4.1.4. Present Value of Profits 
 
As stated above, if   is sufficiently low, the number of firms is still constant, the 
model can be closed by solve the equilibrium number of firms,  . Forward-looking 
firms will entre to the industry until the total present value of profits equals to zero. 
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Supposing an arbitrage firm adopts innovation at the time of       , and then the 
present value of profits is: 
 
       
  
 
                
    
  
  
              
               
 
  
                        
 
Substituting the respective profits and the distribution function, one derives the 
zero-profits as: 
 
              
                
   
 
       
        




        
 
The conduct of equation (33) is presented in Appendix 19. The above zero-profit 
condition implicitly defines the number of firms  . Use the envelope theorem we can 
verify the equilibrium profit is decreasing in n. This zero-profit condition along with the 
      (defined by 32) portrays the autarky economy equilibrium. 
 
4.1.5. Characteristics of the Stable (No-Exit) Equilibrium 
 
In the previous section, it is claimed that the sufficient small   is key factor to 
guarantee the constant number of firms. We are now in the position to illuminate this 
claim and its implication more precisely and detailed. Note that, firms make positive 
profits by producing differentiated goods. They use these profits to defray the entry 
costs    as well as the new technology adoption cost      . The sufficient small   
ensures the per-period profit is strictly positive; therefore, no firm has the incentive to 
exit with the positive per-period profit. Under this setting, for a firm adopts new 
technology at time   , the zero-profit condition can be rewrite as:  
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The no-exit equilibrium means the number of firms is constant and all firms will 
eventually adopt the new technology. Therefore, by the time of       , low-tech firms 
cannot profitability to stay in the market, which is showing as follows: 
 
             
                      
 
        
 
The conduct of equation (35) is presented in Appendix 20. This condition illustrates that 
at time of    , for an arbitrary firm, adopts new technology is more profitable than not 
adopt. Therefore, no firm will deny adopting. Consequently, (35) can be rewritten as: 
 
           
                
 
        
 
The conduct of equation (36) is presented in Appendix 21.In addition, for an arbitrage 
firm adopts technology at     the zero-profit condition can rewrite as: 
 
          
  
 
                
    
 
  
                        
         
             
  
 
                
                
 
                     
  
     
 
This yields  
 
               
    
  
 
                           
 
(37) captures key the condition for no-exit equilibrium: the sunk costs of entry    is 
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not paid off until all firms have adopted high technology (i.e., after    ). That is to say, 
the positive per-period profit is not only used to cover the adopting cost but also used to 
defray the entry costs   . This condition has two important implications; first, given the 
certain scale of innovation, the sufficient large    ensures it is hard to induce a 
shakeout since firms have to adopt the new technology to earn positive profits for 
covering the entry costs and this provides the industry with a strong stabilizing force. In 
addition, it also illustrates why the number of firms is constant through time. Second, it 
implicitly defines at the date of    (     )    is paid off, which can be showed by 
following equation: 
 
                 
    
 
 
              
 
Insert the equation (38) into (34 , the zero-profit condition can be rewritten as: 
 
           
 
 
    
                
   
 
           
      
  
 




              
   
The most interesting property of equation (39) is the composition of fixed cost 
 
 
      can be changed in such a way that makes    can be paid off earlier. In 




      constant. Besides, the equilibrium values of    ,    and   
will not change for a relative large range of   and    such that 
 
 
       is 
unchanged. Therefore, the decreasing value in    results in the increasing value of   . 
From (38), this tradeoff leads to      happen earlier. In other words,    approaches to   . 
 
Figure 6 depicts this tradeoff. As    decreases while keep the 
 
 
      unchanged, 
this tradeoff increases the per-period fixed cost   which results in decreasing in the net 
per-period profit. However, as long as   is small enough to satisfy the condition of 
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        (i.e., the per-period profit is positive for all low-tech firms) and keep    
sufficiently large and the equilibrium values of    still holds, so that        (i.e.; 
the sunk costs of entry are not paid off until all firms have adopted), then no firm will 
have an incentive to exit and the equilibrium involves a constant number of firms. 
 
 
                         Figure6: the effect of decreasing    and increasing   
 
4.1.6. Characteristic of the Shakeout (Exit) Equilibrium 
 
If the tradeoff between   and    continues, it will eventually arrive to a point where 
the per-period profit equals to zero (        ), and    are paid off at         . 
   is used to denote the point where low-tech firms make zero per-period profit and 
entry costs have just paid off. Besides, at this point, a non-adopter is indifferent between 
staying the market and paying off the adoption cost       for adoption, or not 
adopting and exiting at    since both of these options result in the present zero profits. 
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However, if tradeoff continues after reaching to the point of           , one 
apparently result is the low-tech firms will be making negative profit at some point 
during the diffusion process. Evidently, once firms have paid off the entry costs, such 
negative profit will incur them exit from the industry. Therefore, from the above 
illustration the following proposition is established: 
 
Proposition 5. Assuming that F is sufficiently high (   ) and    is sufficiently 
small       , technology adoption within the industry will reduce the net per-period 
profits of low-tech firms to zero. Furthermore, a subset of the low-tech firms will choose 
to exits since they will have paid off their entry costs. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix 22. 
 
The direct implication of Proposition 5 is that the number of firms varied over time; at 
least some low-tech firms have an incentive to exit. The reason of why some firms 
prefer to exit is quite straightforward. The high per-period fixed cost results in low 
per-period operating profit. In addition, the gradual diffusion cost-saving technology 
decreases the products‘ prices. Therefore, the lowering per-period profit along with the 
lowering products‘ prices eventually lead to the per-period profit diminishing to zero at 
some point for some low-tech firms. With the continuation of this diffusion process, 
these low-tech firms will make negative profits if they keep staying in the industry. 
Consequently, at least some low-tech firms prefer to exiting (shakeout happens). 
Otherwise they will earn negative profits before adopting new technology. However, 
despite the diminished profit opportunities, the low sunk costs of entry imply firms are 
still willing to enter to the industry at the beginning phase. Specifically, there is an 
over-entry in the early stage of the industry, more firms in the initial stage than stay 
permanently. The cause of the over-entry is that firms can earn positive profits by 
entering the industry at the inception, with low sunk costs of entry, firms could quickly 
recoup their initial investment and then exit before the competitive pressures require 
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them to employ new technology. Thus, in order to acquire these profits, firms 
temporarily enter to the industry and leaving when technology competitive pressure 
pushes the per-period profit to zero. (i.e., the number of firms changes over time). This 
part of theory is similar to the traditional literature on industrial evolution—technical 
progress makes competitive pressure for low-tech firms and forces them to exit the 
industry. However, the exit phenomenon in E&M (2009) framework needs more 
explanation. In this model, technologically lagging firms could always choose to adopt 
new technology to become high-tech firms and thus earn positive profits rather exit. The 
traditional literature of product life cycle typically assumes firms differ in terms of 
ability to adapt new technology and the phenomenon of over-entry and subsequent exit 
is caused by the uncertainty of the process of technology diffusion, as in Klepper (1996) 
myopic decision-making by firms with randomized access to the market generates the 
over-entry and subsequent situation. By contrast, E&M (2009) considers perfect 
information environment; firms are endogenously to choose adopting or exiting. 
Low-tech firms could choose to adopt the cost-saving technology in response to the 
competitive pressure rather than exit. The novel feature in E&M (2009) is: shakeout is a 
natural outcome in the setting of standard technology diffusion framework, and it is not 
caused by any randomness or exogeneity in the diffusion process.
6
 In fact, E&M (2009) 
is similar the Götz (2002), Petrakis and Roy (1999) and Petrakis et.al (1997), which 
explain industry evolution in the absence of uncertainty. In Götz (2002), combining 
with sunk costs, limitation on the number of potential entrants and heterogeneity yield 
the existence of profit opportunities early in the life of an industry, which encourages 
temporary entry. In other words, due to the presence of profits opportunities, firms are 
willing to bear sunk entry costs in the short run to acquire these windows profits. In 
Petrakis and Roy (1999), the investment in cost reduction leads to firms‘ expansion 
their optimal scale. Since the market demand is stationary, the industry may not be able 
to sustain all existing firms without excessive prices reductions, therefore, some firms 
                                               
6
 This is not to say uncertainty or randomness does not play a role in generating the exit phenomenon. But, the point of this paper is 
to offer fully deterministic model to explain the shakeout phenomenon and this explanation can regard as a complement analysis to 
existing literature.   
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have to exit due to should give appropriate incentives for cost reduction. While in and 
Petrakis et.al (1997), due to learning by doing, firms adjust their long run output level 
only over time. Since demand is given, the growth in output leads to sharply decrease in 
prices results in firms have to exit. 
 
It is noteworthy to mention the exit phenomenon is a common feature in industrial 
evolution. According to the study by Gort and Klepper (1982), 22 industries experience 
shakeouts out of 46. The average rate of shakeouts measured by the number of firms 
after the decrease, relative to the peak is about 40%. The leading example is the U.S. 
tire industry, about 50% of firms exit from the industry in five years time. E&M (2009) 
model not only explains why exit happens, but also illustrates why such periods of exit 
can be so dramatic and abrupt. The Proposition 5 has explained this framework can 
generate a shakeout; the next step is to analyze the pattern of the exit, which induces the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 6. The firms, which exit, do at the same time (shakeout occurs) 
 
Proof: See the Appendix 23. 
 
The feedback between the exit decisions and the innovation adoption decisions for 
low-tech firms causes the dramatic exit phenomenon. The sharp exit is accompanied by 
the dramatic increase for remaining firms adopted high technology. In other words, the 
reduction in the number of firms   increases the adoption rate  . However, this 
increased rate will lead to more low-tech firms exit from the industry. It is this positive 
feedback that results in exit being sudden rather gradual and it plays a key role to 
distinct the mechanism in this paper with those at work in the rest of literature. 
Intuitively, the reduction in   is compensated by an increase in   in equilibrium so 
that the first-order condition remains satisfied. At the time of shakeout, there will be a 
jump in  . Consequently, in the setting of endogenizing the technology adoption process, 
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E&M (2009) model recurs the stylized fact technology diffusion is a very lengthy and 
gradual process rather than simultaneous process; besides, it is also capable to explain 




So far it has been proved the condition of non-stable industry equilibrium is the size of 
the sunk costs of entry relative to the recurring fixed costs of production, given the 
existence of an innovation (   ). It also has been showed the pattern of exit is that 
firms do so en mass. Nevertheless, in order to complete the description, the equilibrium 
distribution function needs to be derived. Use    to denote firms permanently in the 
industry and    denotes the firms temporarily in the market, as they enter to the 
market at time of     and leave it before at the point of      . To summarize, the 
shakeout equilibrium is featured by the technology adoption rate      of permanent 
firms    as well as the number of temporary low-tech firms   . Assuming shakeout 
happens at    , the following equilibrium distribution function      describes the 
process of technological progress:  
  






                                                
      
        
 
     
          
                                               
      
        
 
 
      
                                                   
                                           
  
 
Where      stands for the permanent firms that have already adopted high technology 
during the diffusion process. The conduct of equation (40) is presented in Appendix 24. 
At interval of         , no firm chooses to adopt the innovation due to the extremely 
expensive adoption cost and this is the same with the no-shakeout case. After   , as the 
adoption cost falls, low-tech firms gradually adopt the new technology. However, there 
is shakeout during the diffusion process of the time interval of        , reflecting the 
                                               
7 See Jovanovic and Lach (1997) and Karshenas and Stoneman (1995) for empirical evidence on the length of diffusion process.  
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change in the number of firms in the market; in particular, at the time of shakeout, there 
is a discrete increase in adoption rate   which is compensated by the reduction of  . 
After the shakeout, only    firms left and the gradually diffusion process continues. 
Finally, all    firms have adopted new technology by period of   . 
 
The Figure 7 depicts this equilibrium distribution function. Clearly, at point of    , 
when shakeout happens, the adoption rate jumps from   to  , which indicates the 
fraction of firms adopting new technology increases. Specifically, the positive feedback 
between exit decisions and adoptions decision by low-tech firms results in a jump in the 
number of firms adopting innovation. Nevertheless, this increased adoption rates induce 
more low-tech firms exiting.  
 
  














                 Figure 7: equilibrium distribution function 
 
However, the equilibrium also illustrates not all low-tech firms are exiting, the fraction 
of low-tech firms making negative profits in the interval of         is    
      
    
      
 
     
        
. Besides, it is easily to calculate the shakeout size is determined by: 
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From previous section, it is already proved the key factor to generate a shakeout is the 
size of the sunk costs of entry relative to the recurring fixed costs, given the existence of 
an innovation (   ). Figure 8 specificities the interaction between    and   in 




    start from the situation of    ,     . In this case, the per-period profit is 
bounded to be positive; firms do not have any incentive to exit once them entering to 
the industry. Consequently, there is no shakeout. However, as we begin to increase   
and decrease    along the line with slope of –  . Finally, it will arrive to the critical 
point          in which the last low-tech firm is indifferent of staying in the market and 
adopting, or exiting and not adopting. This is the case E&M (2009) discussed in 
Proposition 5 and is associated with s unique            However if the tradeoff 














              
             Figure 8: division of parameter space into shakeout and no-shakeout equilibria 
 
Figure 8 interprets the shakeout and no-shakeout equilibria, where the higher ratio of 
     the higher probability of an industry will experience a shakeout, given the size of 
innovation is constant. The reason behind this division of the parameter space is direct: 
the lower    symbolizes firms are relative easily to enter the industry, whereas the 
higher   stands for firms are the more sensitive to technology change. These two 
F 
   
   
      Slope=-r 
Shakeout 
No shakeout 
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factors together signify an industry is more likely to undergo a shakeout. This 
explanation also illustrates innovation change is not the only reason to generate a 
shakeout. If an industry is character with high    and low   , even the dramatic 
technology change cannot trigger a shakeout because no firms have incentive to exit 
from the industry once they paid off the sunk costs of entry. Specifically, firms need to 
stay in the industry for a long time to adopt the innovation to earn positive per-period 
profit so as to cover these costs. In contrast, a relative small innovation may trigger a 
shakeout in a market with relative low sunk costs of entry. 
 
4.2. Shakeouts and International Trade 
     
The preceding section describes the industrial evolution in the closed economy case. 
The focus on a closed economy study reflects on the existing empirical and theoretical 
literatures are mainly concentrated on understanding shakeouts phenomenon in 
domestic U.S. context. Nevertheless, the importance of international trade that can play 
a role in determining the evolution of market structure is neglected. Indeed, opening to 
trade for an industry increases the degree of competition in domestic market which in 
turn decreases the market share for individual domestic firm. Besides, international 
trade also can increase the productivity of firms which leads to the reduction in the 
number of domestic firms, in much the same way as innovation did. However, there is 
the other side of the story: access to international trade also allows domestic firms enter 
to the foreign market which enable them export their extra production to other countries. 
This offers an important way for domestic firms to accommodate the extra production 
capacity created by adoption of new technology, alleviate the possibility of domestic 
shakeouts. This implies the degree of openness is possible to have a profoundly 
influence on the evolution of industry. 
 
However, extending the model in open economy setting also imports a series of new 
problems. The key question is how to determine the degree of openness affect the 
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likelihood of shakeout? Besides, same industry in different countries does not share the 
uniform evolution of market structure. As a matter of course, E&M (2009) bring up the 
questions of whether countries undergo same intensity of shakeouts or whether 
shakeouts occur at the same time across countries. The answers to these questions rest 
on what are the distinctions among countries and whether these differences have impact 
on the industrial evolution. Based on the empirical evidences, the market size is the 
fundamental distinction between countries (e.g., countries are more likely to show vast 
differences in market size rather than the elasticity of demand for a product and the size 
of a given innovation). However, E&M (2009) assumes the market size is neutrality on 
industrial evolution. This assumption guarantees the shakeout phenomenon in different 
country should be similar. According to the empirical findings, the industry such as 
automobile reveals the symmetric shakeouts (i.e., shakeouts occurred roughly same time 
and magnitude) happen across European countries and the U.S.
8
 However, there still 
exist lots of industries which are stable in one county but experience a shakeout in some 
other countries. In the beginning part of section 4, it has argued the synthetic dye 
industry in France experienced dramatic shakeout in the mid 1860s, but showed 
gradually increase in the number in German before 1914. The reason of German firms 
gain dominance in the field of synthetic dye industry can attribute to the following 
factors: trained chemical engineers, patent laws that only allowed for process patents, 
and other institutional factors.
9
 All of these factors create the superiority for German 
firms to adopt new technology. Thus, guided by the synthetic dye example, E&M (2009) 
introduce an open economy shakeouts model in which countries differ in terms of their 
technological capabilities. 
 
4.2.1. Asymmetric Adoption Costs 
 
Even though firms show vast diversity in a number of dimensions, the synthetic dye  
                                               
8 See Carroll and Hannan (1995) for detailed analyses of the symmetric shakeouts in the automobile industry. 
9 See Murmann and Homburg (2001) for an in-depth analysis of the synthetic dye industry. 
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example implies the longevity of firms mainly depends on the differences in new 
technology adoption cost. In accord with this example, assuming the cost of adoption 
new technology is        for all    in foreign country which means adoption 
innovation is prohibitive for foreign firms. This leads to the asymmetric case which 
satisfies the synthetic dye industry: countries differ with regards to technology 
capabilities. Besides, foreign variable is denoted by star (*). By contrast, in the home 
country, the adoption cost is              , still the same with the proceeding 
section. The firm‘s pricing rule in domestic and foreign market is the same given in (5) 
& (14) in section 3: 
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. 
 
Therefore, the individual firm‘s operating profits can be figured out. 
 
4.2.2. Free Trade 
 
At first, considering the free trade (i.e.,   ) case and use it as a benchmark. To 
generate a shakeout, tradeoff    and   while keep         constant, eventually 
it will arrive to the critical point that can induce a shakeout. However, as this tradeoff 
continues, the size of shakeout increases. There exists a special combination of 
   and   that generates a shakeout just as it did in closed economy situation. But unlike 
to the closed economy case, the location of firms that exit is indeterminacy. Both home 
and foreign country have same the likelihood to experience a shakeout under free trade 
situation. In other words, if it is possible for home country‘s firm to enter and 
subsequent exit from the industry before adopting high technology, then it also could 
happen in foreign country. However, the degree of competition faced by different place 
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firms does not affect by the location of shakeout. Consequently, in equilibrium there is 
an arbitrary in the location of firms that exit. 
 
4.2.3. Trade and the Location of Shakeouts 
 
By contrast, if an arbitrarily small trade barrier is imported, and then the location of 
firm‘s exit can be unique determined. Specifically, reciprocal trade barriers offer 
relative greater protection for firms which have the smallest differentiated goods since 
the major competition is from abroad. There is asymmetric cost of adoption in E&M 
(2009) framework; firms prefer locating in the technology advanced (home) country 
since they can adopt new technology better. But, there still exists a small number of 
firms chooses to locate in foreign country in the presence of trade barriers, owing to the 
trade barriers can help them mitigate the degree competition from home country. 
Besides, firms which are located in technologically lagging country enjoy the relative 
higher profits in the early phase of industry cycle due to the existence of trade barriers 
and lower profits in the later phase (since they are precluded to adopt high technology 
as readily as home firms). However, in E&M (2009) model, shakeouts will occur if 
firms can recoup their sunk cost of entry before adopting new technology. Therefore, 
the foreign country seems a likely candidate to have the shakeouts. Consequently, the 
following proposition is established: 
 
Proposition 7. If       and    is sufficiently low, then the entire exit occurs in 
foreign country (  
            ) and all of the permanent firms are located in 
home country (    ). 
 
Proof: See Appendix 25. 
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Since the size of shakeout can be approximately determined by 
  
  
       , under 
the condition of relative small shakeouts (i.e. less than 50% of firms exit the markets), 
the Proposition 7 explains all exit occurs in foreign country. This reflects that fact that, 
firms which are located in technological lagging country can enjoy the benefits from 
reduced competition (due to the presence of trade barriers) in the early period of product 
life cycle. With relative higher per-period profit, they can pay off the sunk costs of    
earlier, this results in the shakeouts happens in foreign country. Besides, the relative 
small shakeouts guarantee the number of foreign firms is smaller than that of home 
firms, which ensure foreign firms take advantage of trade barriers. However, there still 
exists a possibility of the shakeouts involves more than 50% firms exit, namely, 
if      , then 
  
  
     with the condition of sufficient small   . If the entire exit 
happens in foreign country, this means the number of foreign firms is larger than that of 
home country. Thus, the home low-tech firms enjoy the benefits of trade barriers in the 
early stage of product life cycle. Because home firms have higher per-period profit 
which correspondingly speeds up the compensation to the sunk entry costs and thus 
making the home country as a possible candidate of the shakeout location. As it is 
showed in the following proposition, both country will experience a shakeout, but it is 
occurred at different time and intensities. 
 
Proposition 8. If        and    is sufficiently low, then both countries have 
shakeouts. The shakeouts occur at different times across countries: The shakeout in the 
home country occurs first (  
    ), but the magnitude of the shakeout is greater in the 
foreign country. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 26. 
 
The intuition behind of Proposition 8 can be explained by the support of Figure 9. In 
the initial stage of product life cycle, firms locate in both countries have the symmetric 
elementary technology (i.e. before    all firms are low-tech). But the larger number of 
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foreign firms induces the lower per- period profit compares to the home firms. After   , 
firms in home country begin to adopt new technology, as before, this adoption process 
decreases per-period profit for all low-tech firms. But, due to the trade barriers, the 
foreign firms, to some extent, can evade the competition from high-tech home firms. At 
some point, the diffusion process in home country results in the per-period operating 
profit for home low-tech firms less than their foreign counterpart, after this change and 
with the continuation of innovation diffusion, it eventually arrives to the point of   . At 
this point, the per-period profit equals to the fixed cost (i.e.        ) and the sunk 
costs of entry    just paid off for low-tech home firms. Thus, a shakeout happens in 
home country. Nevertheless, foreign low-tech firms have not paid off the sunk costs of 
entry and they still earn positive operating profit at   . However, the continuation of 
new technology diffusion process in home country finally conduces to per-period profit 
diminishing to zero for foreign low-tech firms. In equilibrium, this coincides with the 
date at which the entry costs are paid off   






















     
  
         
      
 
Home per-period profits: low-tech 
 
Foreign per-period profits 
pfprofits:low-tech 
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Proposition 7 and 8 demonstrate the factors that can generate a shakeout in the open 
economy setting and they have deeply significations for empirical analyses. In current 
literature, there are few articles considering the impacts of international trade in 
determining structure of the domestic market. Existing empirical and theoretical 
literatures explicate the industrial evolution solely focusing on the number of domestic 
firms and changing in the domestic market structure. In particular, current literature has 
been the exclusive focus on the U.S. industries and their evolution in the 20
th
 century. It 
is naturally to assume U.S. industries are technology leader and the innovation is 
underlying factor for industrial evolution. Given these assumptions, the significance of 
Proposition 7 and 8 are straightforward. To be concrete, if two industries are exactly the 
same in all respects (market size, trade barrier, technology level and IRS) except the 
extent of the international integration, the evolution of domestic industry can be entirely 
distinct. Supposing the one industry is closed to trade and experiences a shakeout where 
about 50% of firms are exiting from the industry. The other industry, which has totally 
same characteristic with the former one other than exposure to trade, the open industry 
will not undergo shakeouts at all. Furthermore, even if the number of firms exits during 
the shakeout in the closed economy larger than 50%, the open industry may only go 
through a small decline in the number of firms. Thus, greater openness can bring on a 
more stable market structure from the perspective of technological advanced countries. 
It is very evidently trade liberalization has far-reaching effect on the evolution of 
industry which is not play a role in current literature. 
  
4.2.4. International Trade and the Frequency of Shakeouts 
 
In this section, the basic question is: dose lowering trade barriers reduce the possibility 
of an industry experience a shakeout? In the preliminary and incomplete version 
international trade and industrial dynamics from E&M in 2005 (henceforth E&M 
(2005)), it considers this question in the following situation: countries are symmetric but 
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the introduction of international trade induces firms are asymmetric. Specifically, 
exposure to trade leads to only a fraction of firms becomes exporters; in other words, it 
is assumed that firms are different in terms of export ability. E&M (2005) also assumes 
trade between two symmetric countries are costly, firms choose to export not only have 
to pay the per-unit cost which is denoted by     for unit of good (i.e.; transportation 
costs or tariffs) but also face with some fixed costs   to export. These assumptions are 
consistent with the section 3.2. It is exactly the presence of such fixed costs 
endogenously sort firms into exporters and non-exporters. In addition, such fixed costs 
  induce the situation of only a fraction of firms chooses to export which is denoted 
by   . Besides, due to the per-unit cost    , exporting firms will set a higher price in 
the foreign market to reflect their higher marginal costs, while each firm‘s pricing rule 
in the domestic market still expressed by (5) 
 
             
 
   
                   
 
      
  
 
Whereas the prices for serving foreign markets of low-tech and high-tech of exporting 
firms are: 
 
          
   
  
   
                  
  
  
      
       
 
These are the same with section 3. From the above prices, it is straightforward to derive 
the operating profits of each firm. Under these assumptions, E&M (2008) have proved 
in section 3, firms choose to export also will adopt innovation first. In addition, the 
equilibrium distribution function (for    ) is given by (22) 
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No firms choose to adopt innovation in the period       . Then starting from   , 
exporters begin to adapt the new technology, and by  , all exporters become high-tech 
firms. Non-exporters adoption is postponed to   with final adopter adopting at the time 
of   . 
 
As discussed in previous section, if we tradeoff    and     to the critical point of the 
last adopter (non-exporter) is indifferent between exiting and staying. A natural 
question raised in our mind: how dose trade liberalization affect the stability of an 
industry? As E&M (2005) shows in the following proposition, the lower trade barriers 
the more stable of an industry as it reduce the likelihood of a shakeout. 
 
Proposition 9. A shakeout is less likely (i.e.; the critical      that divides the shakeout 
equilibria from the non-shakeout is higher) the lower are trade barriers. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 27. 
 
Figure 10 interprets this result. As it is showed in Figure 10, the reduction in trade 
barriers increase the      cut-off at which makes a shakeout less likely occurs in the 
industry. The direct implication of Proposition 9 is: more open industries are less likely 
to experience a shakeout than comparable industries. In fact, the proof of Proposition 9 
can parallel to the Proposition 3 summarized in section 3. It has been proved that lower 
trade barriers increase the speed of adoption for all firms in Proposition 3. While, it is  

















      Figure 10: Effect if trade on the probability of a shakeout 
 
provided here in detail why trade may reduce the possibility of a shakeout. Specifically, 
the result 
   
  
  
   (see (A.50) in Appendix 27) implies lowering trade barriers 
increase the profits in final steady state. In other words, the dynamic path of profits has 
been changed due to trade liberalization, profits are more back-weighted (i.e.; profits 
have increased in the time periods toward the end of industry life). Similar to the 
explanation of Proposition 3, all firms have symmetric technology in the beginning and 
the end of diffusion process and trade barriers play as an impedimental role to foreign 
competition (
    
     
   
  
  ). However, in the middle of diffusion process there is an 
asymmetric situation (when     ) whereas exporters enjoy a relative cost advantage 
and non-exporters are more reliant on trade barriers for survival. Besides, at this time 
interval (   ), trade barriers show positive relationship to profits for all firms (




 ). If trade barriers are lowered, the profits losses in the middle of diffusion process are 
proportionately more than the profits gains in the symmetric phase. Since in equilibrium 
the zero-profit conditions must hold, the loss from symmetric diffusion process is 
compensated by the gains during the late stage of adoption process. Therefore, this 
reduced trade barriers lead to the per-period profit of non-exporter must increase 
  
   
shakeout 
no shakeout 
    (b=1) 
           
slope= -r 
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(
   
  
  
  ). Thus, the increase in profitability is associated with a higher proportion of 
profit being earned in the late stage of adoption process. Given this result; it is not 
surprisingly that firms would be less likely to exit, since exiting would result in 
foregoing this period of increased profits. 
 
4.2.5. Conclusion  
 
The single-country studies of industrial evolution have documented prominent patterns 
in price, output and the number of firms. However, the existing empirical findings 
reveal that many industries have experienced dramatic shakeouts in the number of firms, 
which makes studying the variation in firm numbers is the most attractive topic in 
industrial organization. Many authors (Utterback and Suarez, 1993; Jovanovic and 
MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996) regard technological change as the main reason for 
these dramatic shakeouts. Indeed, innovation plays a key role in most theoretical models 
of a shakeout. Nevertheless, the existing studies mainly focus on closed economy 
models, neglecting the role of international trade on the industrial evolution. In fact, 
firms exit from markets and firm closures are pronounced feature of modern 
international trade. Therefore, incorporating of international trade into the model can 
display very distinctive features of firm exit both within and across countries. 
 
E&M (2009) develop an extension of Götz (1999) model to derive a simple analytically 
solvable dynamic framework which is able to address exit. Specifically, E&M (2009) 
build a model with differentiated goods that features industrial dynamics from the 
national view and also incorporates international trade. The factors which can trigger a 
shakeout are refined. In particular, the model shows that the presence of technological 
change, together with the relative size of entry costs and recurring fixed costs determine 
the likelihood of a shakeout. Specifically, for an innovation of given size, the higher 
value of recurring fixed costs relative to the sunk costs of entry is the easier it is to 
generate a shakeout in a closed economy. The incorporation of international trade into 
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the model helps to eliminate the shortcoming of solely national view of industrial 
dynamics. E&M (2009) proves that the industries with lower trade barriers tend to have 
more stable market structure. In other words, industry is less likely to experience a 
shakeout with greater openness. The more integrated industries in international trade, 
the smaller probability of experiencing shakeouts. Thus, from both the national and 
international points of view, trade generates more stable industrial evolution. 
 
5. Conclusion Remarks 
 
Two heterogeneous models with international trade are presented in this paper. The first 
model (E&M (2008)) is used to investigate the impact of trade liberalization on 
technology diffusion rates and thus the influence on firm-level productivity. There is 
very extensive literature emphasizing the role of technological change in shaping 
market structure. Consequently, in order to accordance with the literatures, I assume 
that the technological change drives the industrial evolution. The gradual technology 
diffusion process creates productivity differences among firms in equilibrium. In order 
to understand the implication of trade policy thoroughly, I assume the number of firms 
to be constant in an industry. Therefore, by considering a model where firm 
heterogeneity is an equilibrium outcome, I can explain many stylized facts regarding to 
the firm-level behavior and the impact of trade liberalization on technology adoption. 
The general conclusion from the first model is that trade liberalization tends to speed up 
the technology adoption rates for all types of firms (both exporter and non-exporters) 
and thus increase the firm-level productivity. This model can be regarded as a 
complement to the influential papers such as Melitz (2003) and BEJK (2003) which 
consider reallocation of production is the most important way of productivity 
improvement in response to trade liberalization.  
 
In order to understand the causes of shakeouts, the second model is built to investigate 
what factors determine an industry market structure from both national and international 
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view. Based on the first model, the second model relaxes the assumption of constant 
number of firms and adds the per-period fixed cost to demonstrate that; given the 
existence of an innovation, the size of the sunk costs of entry relative to the recurring 
fixed costs determines the likelihood of shakeouts in a closed economy. However, the 
single-country studies on industrial evolution ignore the importance of international 
trade in shaping the market structure of an industry. Therefore, incorporating 
international trade into the model provides better understanding for the forces of 
shaping the industry structure. I show that industries with lower trade barriers are likely 
to have lower possibility of a shakeout. In other words, if an industry is more integrated 
into the international market, it will less likely experience a shakeout. Therefore, trade 
generates a more stable industry structure. The basic conclusion from the second model 
is that international trade plays an important role in determining the market structure of 

















- 67 - 
 
6. References  
 
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1994). The sensitivity of strategic and corrective R&D 
policy in oligopolistic industries. Journal of International Economics, 36(1-2), 133-150.  
 
Baldwin, J. R., & Gu, W. (2003). Export-market participation and productivity 
performance in canadian manufacturing. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue 
Canadienne d'Économique, 36(3), 634-657.  
 
Bernard, A. B., Eaton, J., Jensen, J. B., & Kortum, S. (2003). Plants and productivity in 
international trade. American Economic Review, 93(4), 1268-1290.  
 
Bernard,A., Jensen, J.B., 1995. Exporters, jobs, and wages in U.S.manufacturing 
1976–1987. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.Microeconomics 67–112. 
 
Bernard, A. B., & Bradford Jensen, J. (1999). Exceptional exporter performance: Cause, 
effect, or both? Journal of International Economics, 47(1), 1-25.  
 
Bernard, A. B., & Jensen, J. B. (2004). Why some firms export. Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 86(2), 561-569.  
 
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B., & Schott, P. K. (2006). Trade costs, firms and productivity. 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(5), 917-937.  
 
BERNARD, A. B., REDDING, S. J., & SCHOTT, P. K. (2007). Comparative 
advantage and heterogeneous firms. Review of Economic Studies, 74(1), 31-66.  
 
Broda, C., & Weinstein, D. E. (2006). Globalization and the gains from variety*. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), 541-585.  
- 68 - 
 
CARROLL, G., AND M. T. HANNAN, ―Automobile Manufacturers‖ in G. Carroll, and 
M. T. Hannan, eds., Organizations in Industry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
 
Chaney, T. (2008). Distorted gravity: The intensive and extensive margins of 
international trade. American Economic Review, 98(4), 1707-1721.  
 
Clerides, S. K., Lach, S., & Tybout, J. R. (1998). Is learning by exporting important? 
micro-dynamic evidence from colombia, mexico, and morocco. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 113(3), pp. 903-947. 
 
Ederington, J., & McCalman, P. (2008). Endogenous firm heterogeneity and the 
dynamics of trade liberalization. Journal of International Economics, 74(2), 422-440.  
 
Ederington, J., & McCalman, P. (2009). INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS*. International Economic Review, 50(3), 961-989.  
 
Flaherty, M. T. (1980). Industry structure and cost-reducing investment. Econometrica, 
48(5), pp. 1187-1209. 
 
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1985). Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of 
new technology. The Review of Economic Studies, 52(3), pp. 383-401.  
 
Gort, M., & Klepper, S. (1982). Time paths in the diffusion of product innovations. The 
Economic Journal, 92(367), pp. 630-653. 
 
Grubel, Herbert G., and Peter Lloyd. 1975. Intra-Industry Trade: The Theory and 
Measurement of International Trade in Differentiated Products. London: MacMillan. 
 
- 69 - 
 
Götz, G. (1999). Monopolistic competition and the diffusion of new technology. The 
Rand Journal of Economics, 30(4), pp. 679-693.  
 
Götz, G. (2002). Sunk costs, windows of profit opportunities, and the dynamics of entry.  
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(10), 1409-1436.  
 
Hopenhayn, H. A. (1992). Entry, exit, and firm dynamics in long run equilibrium. 
Econometrica (1986-1998), 60(5), 1127.  
 
Jovanovic, B., & Lach, S. (1997). Product innovation and the business cycle.  
International Economic Review, 38(1), pp. 3-22.  
 
Jovanovic, B., & MacDonald, G. M. (1994). The life cycle of a competitive industry. 
The Journal of Political Economy, 102(2), pp. 322-347.  
 
Karshenas, M., Stoneman, P., 1995. Technological diffusion. In: Stoneman, P. (Ed.), 
The Economics of Innovation and Technological Change. Basil Blackwell. 
 
Klepper, S. (1996). Entry, exit, growth, and innovation over the product life cycle. The 
American Economic Review, 86(3), pp. 562-583.  
 
Klepper, S., & Graddy, E. (1990). The evolution of new industries and the determinants 
of market structure. The Rand Journal of Economics, 21(1), pp. 27-44.  
 
Klepper, S., & Miller, J. H. (1995). Entry, exit, and shakeouts in the united states in new 
manufactured products. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13(4), 
567-591.  
 
- 70 - 
 
Klepper, S., & Simons, K. L. (2000). The making of an oligopoly: Firm survival and 
technological change in the evolution of the U.S. tire industry. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 108(4), pp. 728-760.  
 
Klepper, S., & Simons, K. L. (2005). Industry shakeouts and technological change. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(1-2), 23-43.  
 
Krugman, P. (1980). Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade. 
The American Economic Review, 70(5), pp. 950-959.  
 
Lipsey, R. E. (1976). Intra-industry trade: The theory and measurement of international 
trade in differentiated products : Herbert J. grubel and P.J. lloyd, (john wiley, new york, 
1975) pp. 205, $24.00. Journal of International Economics, 6(3), 312-314. 
 
Melitz, M. J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate 
industry productivity. Econometrica, 71(6), 1695-1725.  
 
MELITZ, M. J., & OTTAVIANO, G. I. P. (2008). Market size, trade, and productivity. 
Review of Economic Studies, 75(1), 295-316.  
 
Miyagiwa, K., & Ohno, Y. (1995). Closing the technology gap under protection. The 
American Economic Review, 85(4), pp. 755-770. 
 
Murmann, J. P., & Homburg, E. (2001). Comparing evolutionary dynamics across 
different national settings: The case of the synthetic dye industry, 1857-1914. Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, 11(2), 177-205. 
 
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. (1978). Forces generating and limiting concentration 
under schumpeterian competition. The Bell Journal of Economics, 9(2), pp. 524-548. 
- 71 - 
 
Pavcnik, N. (2002). Trade liberalization, exit, and productivity improvements: Evidence 
from chilean plants. Review of Economic Studies, 69(1), 245-276.  
 
Petrakis, E., Rasmusen, E., & Roy, S. (1997). The learning curve in a competitive 
industry. The Rand Journal of Economics, 28(2), pp. 248-268. 
 
Petrakis, E., & Roy, S. (1999). Cost-reducing investment, competition, and industry 
dynamics. International Economic Review, 40(2), 381-401.  
 
Reinganum, J. F. (1981). On the diffusion of new technology: A game theoretic 
approach. The Review of Economic Studies, 48(3), pp. 395-405.  
 
Rodrik, D., 1992. Closing technology gaps: does trade liberalization really help? In: 
Helleiner, G. (Ed.), Trade Policy, Industrialization and Development: New Perspectives. 
Claredon Press. 
 
Trefler, D. (2004). The long and short of the canada-U.S. free trade agreement. The 
American Economic Review, 94(4), pp. 870-895. 
 
Yeaple, S. R. (2005). A simple model of firm heterogeneity, international trade, and 









- 72 - 
 
Appendix 1. The conduct of the equation (4) 
 
     is the CES function and has a constant elasticity of substitution between any pair 
of the goods 
 
                    
   
 
   
 
 
   
 
   
  
 
where        denotes the demand for brand   at time   by an arbitrage consumer,   
represents the number of varieties in time  . Note that: 
 
     
       
 
 
   
           
 
   
 
 
   
 
      
 
        
 
    
         
   
 
   
 
 
   
 
   
        
 




         
   
 
   
 
 
   
 
   





   
 
  
    
      
 
 
   
  
 
The instantaneous budget constraint: 
 





The Lagrangen corresponding to this maximization is: 
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The maximization of this Lagrangean by        for all   yields the first-order 
conditions: 
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This is equivalent to:              
    
          
   
Inserting (A.1) into the budget constraint (3) and noting the definition of the utility 
function, yields: 
                   
    
          




        
      
       









Inserting this into (A.1) yields the aggregate demand function       for the brand   at 
time  :   
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Appendix 2. The conduct of the aggregate demand function (5) 
 
Mark-up pricing rule for profit-maximizing firms is: 
 
                  
 
Take derivative with respect to   of (A.2) yields: 
 
                





        
                 
 
 












      
         
 
 
   
      
       
 





                 
 
   
          
 














- 75 - 
 
Appendix 3. The conduct of the equations of (6) 
 
The profit of low-tech firms is: 
 
              
 
 
   
            




   
                                  
 
 
       
 
    
   





                         
 
 
   
 
   
 






The profit of high-tech firms: 
 
              
 
 
       
 
   
        





                                    
 
 
       
 
   
 
       
   





                                    
     
 
    
   
 






Therefore, the profit differential between high-tech and low-tech firm is: 
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Appendix 4. The conduct of the equation (7) 
 
The price index is: 
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Appendix 5. The conduct of the equation (8) 
 
Insert (7) into (6) yields the profit differential for high-tech and low-tech firms: 
 
                 
 
 
    




    
   
            
           
                                       
 
             
 
 
               
     
 
    




    
   
            
 
                    
     
             
 
 
Using       minus         yields the profit differential between high-tech and 
low-tech firms: 
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Appendix 6. The conduct of equation (9) 
 
           
    
 
 
             
    
 
 
                     
 
Totally differentiating it with respected to   yields the first-order condition: 
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Appendix 7. The conduct of equation (13) 
 
The zero-profit condition is showing as follows: 
 
                     
  
 
              
    
  
  
            
                                 
 
  
                         
 
Substituting in the respective profits function, one derives as: 
 
     
  
 
                     
   
  
 
   
 
Since    , we have 
 
         
 






             
  
 
            
          
   
  
 
Similarly          
 
             
, since      
      
       
 
 
      
                   
      
      
         
 
             
 
                  
 
   
      
       
 
 
      
             
 
                 
 
  
                      
       
    
 
                
 
  
              
       
  
 
                
     
             
 
- 80 - 
 
       
  
  
              
     
  
     
             
   
                                              
     
         
  
  
   
                                            
 
      




                                     
           
      
  
 
      
 
  
            
     
             
     
 
  
   
 
Since    , therefore: 
 
         
     






              
 
  
           
      
   
  
 
Inserting (A.4), (A.5) & (A.6) into (A.3) yields: 
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Appendix 8. The conduct of equation (15) 
 
The per-period operating profit for an exporter which is low-tech (they faced with both 
domestic and foreign markets) is given by: 
 
  
    
    
              
      
 
  
    
    
  
      











      






      




    
   
         




    
 
Similarly, the operation profit for a high-tech exporter is:    
                    
  
    
    
                   
    
 
  




       
 
  






















      
                   
  
     
 
    
   
         






(A.8) minus (A.7) yields the profit differential of low-tech (  
   and high-tech (  
   
exporters: 
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Appendix 9. The conduct of Proposition 1 
 
Proof: Since there is no per-period fixed cost, the operating profits are positive in both 
domestic and foreign market, and use the equation (16) minus (15) yields: 
 
  
       
        
        
       
         
 
   
         




          
 
This demonstrates the profits differential for an exporter is greater than profit 
differential for an non-exporter for any          According to equation (9), the higher 
profits differential the earlier adoption date  . Exporters have larger profits differential 
than that of non-exporter, so they adopt new technology earlier than non-exporters. This 
explanation directly follows by the assumption of      . 
 
Besides, the result can be directed analyzed from the Figure 2: which easily illustrates 
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Appendix 10. The conduct of equations (17)--(19) 
 
Given the symmetric condition,             
           the price index for a 
representive country is (for        ): 
 
          
  
 
        
           
          
              
          
                                    
           
         
              
         
                              
 
      
 
   
       
 
   
 
   
   
                                      
  
      
 
   
        
  
   
 
   
                     
      
      
               
  
 
     
 
   
 
   
                         
      
 
Substituting (17) into the profit differential given by (15) yields: 
 
         
       
     
         
 
    
   
         





                                         
         
 
    
   
         
  
 
    
   
                             
 
      
      
          
       
     
                 
                              
  
 
Insert the equation (18) into (9) yields optimal date for a exporter in the range of 
       : 
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Appendix 11. The conduct of equations (20) & (21) 
 
The price index for the range of         is: 
 
          
  
 
       
           
          
        
                                    
           
         
        
                             
 
   
 
   
                 
         
 
Insert this price index in to (16) yields: 
 
            
        
      
         
 
    
   
 





                                              
         
 
    




    
   
                         
 
            
        
      
         
                          
 
 
Combine (20) & (9) which yields the distribution function for the non-exporters in the 
range of        (the number of high-tech firms is more than the exporters): 
 
                                       
     
                
         
                          
           
      
      
                  
     
       
 
     
       
        
              
 
- 86 - 
 
Appendix 12. The conduct of Proposition 2 
 
Proof: differentiating (19) & (21) with respect to   yields: 
 
        
      
  
 
           
                   
                                                               
       
       
  
  
         
          
                              
 
The above conductions illustrate trade barriers have negative impact on exporters‘ 
adoption rate, lowering trade barriers speeds up the adoption rate of exporters. On the 
contrary, trade barriers positively affect on non-exporters‘ adoption decisions, declining 
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Appendix 13. The conduct of equation (23) 
 
Supposing an export firm adopts innovation at the time of   , and thus the zero-profit 
condition is: 
 












          








                       
 
Substituting in the respective profits function, this is showing as follows: 
 
The price index at                   is: 
 
          
  
 
     
 
   
 
   
      
     
 
Therefore, the operation profit for a low-tech exporter (A.7) at         is: 
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Similarly, at the time of         ,      
      
       
 
     
   
                
   the price index 
change to: 
 
          
  
 
    
 
   
 
   
                         
     
                                
      
       
 
     
   
                
                  
                                           
     
 
   
 
   
  
                               
 
   
 
                         
      
 
 
Insert this price index into the operation profit for a high-tech exporter (A.8) yields: 
 
   
        
     
 
    
   
         





                   
     
 
    
   
         
  
 
    
                         
      
 
                   
         
             
 
 
      
      




               
 
  
         
             
   
                                                      
                
      
  
 
Similarly,             and       , the price index is: 
 
- 89 - 
 
          
  
 
    
 
   
 
   
                        
 
Insert this price index into the operation profit for a high-tech exporter (A.8) yields: 
 
  
        
     
 
    
   
         
  
 
    
   
                       
 
                      
             
                        
 
 
      
      




          
         
   
               
                    
  
 
Similarly,               ,      
     
       
 
     
       
        
, the price index is: 
 
          
  
 
    
 
   
 
   
                 
         
                        
 
   
 
   
   
      
       
 
     
       
        
              
    
          
                            
 
   
 
                   
      
 
 
Insert this price index into the operation profit for a high-tech exporter (A.8) yields: 
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The price index at                    is: 
 
          
  
 
         
 
   
 
   
      
     
 
Therefore, the operation profit for a high-tech exporter (A.8) at           is: 
 
   
       
     
 
    
   
         





                      
 
 
    
   
         
      
 
    
   
          
 
                     
         
            
 
 
- 91 - 
 
      
      




         
    
        
         
   
  
 
Insert (A.10), (A.11), (A.12), (A.13) & (A.14) into (A.9) yields: 
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Appendix 14. The conduct of equation (24) 
 
Assuming an arbitrage non-exporter adopts new technology at the last opportunity (i.e., 
at the time of   ), the zero-profit condition for a non-exporter is: 
 








           




             
     
 
  
           




                      
 
Substituting in the respective profits function, this is showing as follows: 
The price index at                   of a non-exporter is: 
 
          
  
 
     
 
   
 
   
      
     
 
Therefore, the operation profit for a low-tech non-exporter at          is: 
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Since      
      
       
 
     
   
                
                the price index is: 
 
          
  
 
    
 
   
 
                         
      
 
 
Therefore, the operation profit for a low-tech non-exporter at        is: 
 
    
         
 
 
    
   
 





                      
 
 
    
   
 
   
 
    
                         
      
 
                      
     
                      
 
 
      
      




           
          
                
  
 
Similarly,             and          , the price index is: 
 
          
  
 
    
 
   
 
   
                        
 
Therefore, the operation profit for a low-tech non-exporter at         is: 
 
    
         
 
 
    
   
 





- 94 - 
 
                         
 
                        
 
 
      
      




           
 
   
         
                    
  
 
Similarly,                ,      
     
       
 
     
       
        
, the price index is: 
 
          
  
 
    
 
   
 
   
                 
         
                              
 
   
 
                 
      
 
 
Therefore, the operation profit for a low-tech non-exporter at             is: 
 
   
         
 
 
    
   
 





                    
 
 
    




    
                 
      
 
                   
     
             
 
 
      
      




           
          
      
  
 
The price index at                    is: 
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The operation profit for high-tech non-exporter at          is: 
 
  
        
 
            
 
 
      
      




         
    
        
 
   
 
 
Inserting (A.16), (A.17), (A.18), (A.19) & (A.20) into (A.15) yields: 
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Appendix 15. The conduct of equation (25) 
 
For an exporter: 
 
   
   
  
                     
           
 
                              
                       
 
         
   
    
 
   
  
  
             
        
 
               
                    
 
          
    
   
 
      
           
  
   
  
   
   
   
  




    
   
  
                     
           
 
                           
                       
  
                  
 
   
   
 
    
  
  
             
        
 
               
                    
 
  
    
   
 
      
           
  
   
  
    
   
    
  
    
 
Therefore: 
                   
  
   
  
       
    
  
       
  
                  
- 97 - 
 
Appendix 16. The conduct of equations (26)-(29)  
 
When     , no firms will export,     , for non-exporters, we have 
 








          
            
  




           








                   








                       








                  
      
      
                                    
 
   
 
              
      
     
 
It is independent of  .  
While at       all firms export,       then we have: 
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Which illustrates at        
    
  
  , this implies    is increasing in     
However, when            and the present value of profits for an exporter is: 
 








         
            
  




          








                    








           
     
 
  
               




                    
 
      
      
 
                                        
         
   
 
                       
                        
      
             
 
Take derivative with respect to   , yields 
   
  
  . 
Similarly, at       we have        
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Appendix 17. The conduct of Proposition 3 
 
First, the following lemma can be established: 
Lemma 1. A decrease in trade barrier   implies    occurs earlier iff  




   
<0, 
likewise,    occurs earlier iff  




   
<0. 
 
Proof: from the Figure 2, we note that for a given adoption schedule,    will occur the 
earlier the higher of profit-differential    
    
   for exporting firms which are 
evaluated at    . Similarly, the higher profit-differential   
     
    evaluated at 
    for non-exporting firms the earlier    happens. Thus the realization of Lemma 1 
follows from   
    
            
  for         . 
 
The zero-profit condition for the non-exporters is defined by: 
 
             
 
   
     
     
     
                
 
where   
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Take derivative with respect to   to the equation (A.21) yields:  
 
    
  
   

















Where we have the following conductions: 
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Take derivative with respect to b of   
   yields: 
 




                  
  
                 
   
 
Thus we have: 
 
       
    
  
 








   
  
  
    
 
Likewise, the zero-profit condition for exporters is defined by: 
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Take derivative with respect to   to the equation (A.22)  yields:  
 
   
  
   

















Apparently, we have: 
 
  
    








         
                   
             
        
 
         
   
 
                              
     
     
  




          
               
                    
         
   
 
                     
    
  








          
        
                
      
 
                        
      
 
 
Take derivative with respect to b of   
  yields: 
 




                
      
             
 
Thus, we have: 
 
        
   
  
 








   
 
  
   
 
Rewrite (A.24) as follows: 
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Therefore, the only condition of (A.22) & (A.23) can satisfy is: 
 
   
  
  
   
    
     
   
  
  . 
 
As   
        
 
      （        ）
  therefore, we can derive as follows: 
  
     
   
             
     
    
 
   
     
          where   
                   
 
   
Therefore 
    
     
   
  
   implies   




   
  . According to the Lemma 1, the 
reduction in trade costs   increase the profit differential at     which makes    
occurs earlier. 
 
Similarly, since   
    
             
     
   , therefore: 
 
    
    
  
  
         
    
     
   
          
  
           
  
   
     
       
 
Since   
    
      
        where   
               
 
  Consequently, 
    
    
  
  
   implies   




   
  .Which illustrate the reduction in trade costs   
increase the profit differential at     makes    occur earlier. Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 18. The conduct of Proposition 4 
 
Proof:  totally differentiating (A.23) yields: 
 
 
    
  
   












   
  
  
   
 
Apparently, we have:  
 
   








           
          
          
                
 
              




   
  
  
    this yields: 
 
           








   
  
  
     
 
Similarly, totally differentiating (A.21), one derives: 
 
   
  
   


















    








          
          
                
      
 
                        




   
 
  
  , this yields:  
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From the fact   
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  , it 
is easily to derive following facts: 
 








   
 
  
   
        
    
     
   
  
             
   
  
  
   








   
  
             
  
                         
   
  
    
  
   
 
The only condition for both (A.25) & (A.26) satisfied is: 
 




   
  
  
   
   
  
  
   
 
Similar to Proposition 3, 
    
     
   
  
   implies   




   
  , as   
     
   
    
         where   
                   
 
. Consequently, by Lemma 1, the 
decrease in sunk costs of exporting increase the profit differential which result in    
occurs earlier. 
And due to 
    
     
   
  
   implies   
    
    
  
  
  and  




   
  , as   
    
  
    
        where   
               
 
. According to Lemma 1, the reduction in   
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Appendix 19. The conduct of equation (33) 
 
The zero-profit condition is showing as follows: 
 
                
  
 
                
    
  
  
              
                                 
 
  
                          
 
Substituting the respective profits and the distribution function, one derives the 
zero-profits as: 
 
              
  
 
             
          
   
 




Since          
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Therefore            
     
             
  
 
             
  
  
              
           
      
 




             
 
  
             
      
   
 




Inserting (A.28), (A.29), (A.30) into (A.27) yields: 
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Appendix 20. The conduct of equation (35) 
 
The no-exit equilibrium means the number of firms is constant and all firms will 
eventually adopt the new technology. Therefore, by the time of       , low-tech firms 
cannot profitability to stay in the market, which is showing as follows: 
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Appendix 21. The conduct of equation (36) 
 
If   is sufficiently low so that per-period profit is bounded to be strictly positive. 
Therefore, we have the following derivations: 
 
                                                  
     
      
                                             
     
      




                
 
 




So (35) can be rewritten as: 
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Appendix 22. The conduct of Proposition 5 
 
Proof:    denotes the point where low-tech firms make zero per-period profit and 
entry costs have just paid off. Referring the combination of   and    that achieve the 
case of per-period profit becomes zero and    just paid off as   and   . Assume    
and    are such that         . Referring    as  . Assuming an arbitrage low-tech 
firm adopts high-tech at     Consequently, at the time of  , the per-period profits for 
low-tech firms equal to zero 
 
                      
 
Since referring   as    , therefore, at the time of     the sunk entry cost of    which 
low-tech firms just paid off also at  : 
 
              
               
  
 
        
 
  
               
                      
 
  
   
         
 
      
 
  
                
 
Besides, the cost of adoption equals to the present discounted value of future profits: 
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Now, we increase   from the point defined by (A.33), this tradeoff leads to     
and      , and (A.32) can rewrite as follows:  
 
                   
                 
  
 
        
 
  
                
 
Since    is defined the date    is paid off, so the decreased value of    induces 
    . Consequently, the following equation can be derived: 
 
                  
   
 
  
                 
   
  
 
               
                                    
 
  
   
     
 
         
         
                                            
 
Compare equation (A.33) & (A.35), we can get      
 
  
                . This 
illustrates firms can still earn positive profits by remaining in the market until the 
per-period profit becomes to zero and then exiting (i.e., since they have already paid off 
their sunk entry costs at   ). This is inconsistent with the no-exit equilibrium since no 














- 111 - 
 
Appendix 23. The conduct of Proposition 6 
 
Proof:    denotes the date of shakeout occurs, at that point, for a low-tech firm to exit, 
it must be the case of per-period operating profits cannot be positive:  
 
                         
 
The low-tech firm also has paid off the sunk cost of entry at   : 
 
               
   
  
 
                 
   
  
  
               
                       
          
   
 
           
      
 




Using the first order condition of equation (31) implies: 
 
                       
         
                     
         
                               
 
Since    solves this equation uniquely, all firms that exit must do so at the    , 
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Appendix 24. The conduct of equation (40) 
 
Finally we are in the step to derive the equilibrium distribution function. At interval 
of         , no firms have an incentive to employ the innovation due to the extremely 
expensive adoption cost and this is the same with the no-shakeout case. After   , firms 
gradually adopt the new technology. At the interval of        , the price index is:  
 
          
 
 
       
           
          
                       
                              
 
   
 
   
                       
 
Insert this into (6) yields: 
 
                   
         
                      
  
 
Insert this into (31) yields: 
 
 
         
                      
            
 
Consequently we get: 
 
                 
     
        
 
     
          
                  
 
At time interval of          the shakeout occurs, the price index changes to: 
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Insert this into (6) yields: 
 
                    
         
                  
  
 
Insert this profit differential into (31) yields: 
 
  
         
                  
            
 
Consequently we get: 
 
                      
     
        
 
 
      
                   
 
After   , all permanent firms have already adopted high technology. Therefore, 
combine (A.39) & (A.40) we get:  
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Appendix 25. The conduct of Proposition 7 
 
Proof: assuming the shakeout is to be occurred, it must be the case that at the time of 
shakeouts low-tech firms in both countries are making zero or negative net per-period 
profit. The per-period profit for low-tech home firms is: 
 
    
     
   
 
The per-period profit for foreign low-tech foreign firms is: 
 
  
             
     
               
  
   
       
 
Since b is close to unity, it is strictly greater than 1. Therefore, the ranking of profits 
between two countries only depend on   
      Specifically, the operating profit for 






    
   
 





In foreign country, no firm can adopt new technology. Therefore, the price index is: 
 
             
 
 
   
      
  
                       
 
   
 




Insert this price index to foreign low-tech firms‘ profit function yields: 
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Similarly, the operating profit for low-tech home firm is: 
 
   
 
 
    
   
 






The price index in home country is: 
 
          
 
 
       
           
         
      
                              
 
   
 
   
                    
 
Insert this price index into home country low-tech firms‘ profit function yields: 
  
   
 
 
    
   
 





    
 
                    
  
 
Rank the profits of low-tech between two countries yields: 
 
  
     
 
   
  
 




The sign of   
     is given by     
                 
  which is positive 
since         
 . Therefore, at the time of shakeouts: 
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This means the foreign low-tech firms have higher per-period profit than home low-tech 
firms. Consequently, they will pay off    prior to the home low-tech firms. The foreign 
low-tech firms will exit from the industry once the per-period profit becomes to zero 
along with having paid off   . By contrast, home low-tech firms will be making 
negative profits before they paid off the sunk costs of entry. Consequently, they have 
the incentive to stay in the industry to adapt innovation. Therefore, the equilibrium 
involves   
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Appendix 26. The conduct of Proposition 8 
 
Proof: assuming both countries are undergoing shakeouts. Consequently, at the time of 
shakeouts, low-tech firms in both locations must have paid off the entry costs and the 
per-period profit becomes to zero: 
 
          
     
      
    
    
            
   
 
Supposing the home country experiences a shakeout later than foreign country (    
  
 ), this implies: 
 
  
    
            
          
         
    
    
 
This is owing to the profit function is decreasing in time. However, this also means: 
 
    
            




       





          
 
The above equation illustrates that the home low-tech firms pay off sunk entry costs of 
   earlier than   
 , which is contradict with the assumption of      
 . Please note that 
  
     cannot be part of equilibrium, since firms are paid off    at different rates 
through time, it is impossible both the present value and the zero operating profits 
conditions to hold simultaneously in both countries. Therefore,   
     is the only 
possible configuration consistent with equilibrium.  
 
In order to figure out the intensity of shakeouts between two countries, we only need to 
note in the time interval of       home low-tech firms have higher per-period profit 
than foreign low-tech firms, this requires      
    before   .  
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However, no firm adopts innovation in the time interval of       . Therefore, we have: 
 
     
  
 
        
 
 
   
     
 
      
        
        
 
Therefore   
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Appendix 27. The conduct of Proposition 9 
 
Proof:  a shakeout is possible when a low-tech non-expoter makes non-positive 
per-period profit: 
 
     
         
 
And the entry costs are paid off 
 
     
   
  
 
   
                  
 
  
   
              




                
   
  
 
   
               
 
The zero-profit condition for non-exporters is defined by: 
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Rewrite (A.41) as follows: 
 
              
     
     
     
            
 
 
     
 
where   
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Totally differentiating (A.42) and applying the envelop theorem yields:  
 
        
    
  
   

















By direct calculation, one derives: 
 
         








           
                       
          
                
 
          
        
 
  
Take derivative with respect to b of (A.44) yields: 
 




                  
  
                 
    
 
Thus, trade liberalization reduces the non-exporters‘ profits during the diffusion process 
and (A.43) change to: 
 
        
    
  
 








   
  
  
   
 
Besides, by direct calculation, we have: 
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Consequently,   
   
       
     
  
    
 
Likewise, the zero-profit condition for exporters is: 
 
                
    
    
    
            
 
 








              








              
  




                




         
 
Totally differentiating  (A.46) and applying the envelop theorem yields:  
 
       
   
  
   

















Besides, we have 
 
          








          
                       
                
      
 
                        
      
 
 
Take derivative with respect to b of (A.48) yields: 
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Therefore, (A.47) change to: 
 
       
   
  
 








   
 
  
    
 
As we have  
 
  




         
       
        
 
         
   
 
  




         
     
        
 
         





       
     
  
   
        
In addition, we have   
    
             
     
    
and  
                
   (proved in Appendix 17). These illustrate the export 
profits are proportionally higher than non-exporter profits. By using these derivations, 
we have the following derivations: 
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Therefore, 
   
  
  
   
    
     
   
  
     
 
Since  
   
       
     
  
  . Therefore, 
 
    
     
   
  
    
       
     
 
   
  
  
   
      
              
   
  
  
    
 
Since   
        
 
     
    
 
      
  
Therefore,  
   
     
     
    
 
   
 
     
 
      
          
Consequently,  
   
  
  
   implies  




   
     Since we have     
       and 
thus a reduction in the trade costs increases the      cut-off and thus makes a 
shakeout less likely in the industry. Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
